Saint Louis University Law Journal
Volume 59
Number 4 Federalism and Nationalism: Time
for a Détente? (Summer 2015)

Article 3

2015

Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?
Heather K. Gerken
Yale Law School, heather.gerken@yale.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Heather K. Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?, 59 St. Louis U. L.J. (2015).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol59/iss4/3

This Childress Lecture is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more
information, please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FEDERALISM AND NATIONALISM: TIME FOR A DÉTENTE?

HEATHER K. GERKEN*
INTRODUCTION
There has been a “merry war”1—or maybe just a war—between
federalism’s stalwarts and traditional nationalists. I came to the debate late in
the game, when it had reached that point that Robert McCloskey so vividly
described in constitutional law—when everyone seems like aging boxing club
members who have fought so long that they know each other’s moves and fight
mostly to tire the other out.2
I want to propose a détente between those opposing camps. I actually want
to propose dispensing with these camps altogether, but I’d be happy with
enough of a suspension of hostilities to move federalism debates forward.3 I’ll
explain why the time is right for a détente, the benefits to be gained from it,
and the concessions each side needs to make. My core claim is that the
emergence of what I’ve called the “nationalist school of federalism”4 has
unsettled traditional federalism debates and created the conditions for a détente
to occur. For ease of exposition, I’ll refer to the nationalist school as the “new
nationalists,” just so you can distinguish them from the “traditional
nationalists” when I’m describing the different schools of thought.

* J. Skelly Wright Professor of Law, Yale Law School. What follows is a lightly edited, lightly
footnoted version of the Childress Lecture, which I delivered at St. Louis University School of
Law. I am grateful to the faculty and the dean for inviting me to take part in such a wonderful
lecture. It was a treat to have the opportunity to present this work to scholars I deeply admire. I
was especially grateful to have Joel Goldstein as my host, as he puts the words gentleman and
scholar in the phrase “gentleman scholar.” My thanks to a set of excellent (and speedy) readers,
including Bruce Ackerman, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Bridget Fahey, Dick Fallon, Abbe Gluck, Joel
Goldstein, Alex Hemmer, Sundeep Iyer, Rebecca Lee, Daryl Levinson, David Louk, Erica
Newland, and Daniel Rauch. Great research assistance was provided by Zach Arnold, Marguerite
Colson, Sundeep Iyer, Noah Lindell, Erica Newland, Rosa Po, Daniel Rauch, Zayn Siddique, and
David Simins.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING act 1, sc. 1.
2. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 291 (1972).
3. I use the term “détente” deliberately. A détente implies a temporary and uneasy truce
rather than a demand that each side abandon its principles.
4. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J.
1889, 1890 (2013).
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I recognize the hubris in this. It’s cheeky enough to announce a new school
of federalism, let alone to insist that it should reorient a long-standing debate.
But although this work has been building steadily for a long while, it still
occupies an uneasy place in the debate. Thinking about why that is so has led
to this Article. Be warned, however. It is intended as a provocation.
Here’s the elevator pitch. The emergence of the nationalist school of
federalism—the rise of the new nationalists—has unsettled traditional
federalism debates for two reasons. The first is analytic. The new nationalists’
work destabilizes the fundamental premise undergirding both camps—that
decentralization furthers state-centered aims, and that centralization furthers
nationalist ones. The new nationalists have shaken things up in a second way—
one that goes to ends, not means. Their work has called into question the
empirical and normative foundations of the federalism/nationalism divide by
introducing a quite different picture of federal-state relations into the mix. This
account relies not on sovereignty or autonomy, but on a competing vision of
state power—a notion that one side doesn’t associate with federalism and that
mostly irks the other. The new nationalist account of federal-state relations is
one in which form does not always follow function and federal power does not
always track the exercise of federal jurisdiction, one in which politics and
practice are important as rules and regulations. It is a picture of “Our
Federalism” in which the states play a vibrant role even as the federal
government regulates as it sees fit and in which the real obstacle to uniformity
is politics, not law. That is a reality that neither camp anticipated5 and that
some continue to resist. But it is also a state of affairs that should offer a
reasonably satisfying common ground for both camps or, at least, a new terrain
on which to do battle.
If you accept the new nationalists’ analytic and empirical claims—even if
you believe that they hold at least some of the time—then the time is ripe for a
détente. On the analytic side, the weapons the two camps have been wielding
are too crude for their purposes. And on the empirical side, if we care about
perfecting the democracy we actually have, many of the field’s rumpuses are
either beside the point or incorrectly framed. In the long run, the emergence of
the new nationalists should reorient rivalries inside the federalism tent and help
members of both camps fashion a “new process federalism” that is better
suited for the current debates. There are fights to be had, to be sure. They just
aren’t the ones we’ve been having.
There’s also a leitmotif to my Article. It’s a story about the limits of law,
or maybe the limits of law professors. The claims of the new nationalists are
unsettling for disciplinary reasons as well as substantive ones. If anything, this
5. Though some did, including one of the contributors to this symposium, Ed Rubin. See
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 ULCA
L. REV. 903 (1994).
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work is designed to make law professors crazy—or crazier than they already
are—given their penchant for formal categories, conceptual tidiness, and clear
jurisdictional lines. The heavily descriptive work of the new nationalists shows
a relationship that is negotiated, iterative, interactive, hard to categorize, and
still harder to predict. It is premised on practice as well as presumptions;
processes as well as principles; routines as well as regulations. That means that
much of what is going on cannot be made legible with traditional legal
materials. It’s worse than that, actually, because once you accurately capture
what’s going on, that analysis may not lend itself to legal pronouncements of
any sort. The new nationalists have used a lot of terms to describe federal-state
relations—polyphonic, iterative, negotiated, interactive, uncooperative—but
the most honest term is “messy.” And while we, good law professors all, have
offered our prescriptive arguments about what must be done, at the end of the
day much of “Our Federalism” requires little more than muddling through.
I. THE NEW NATIONALISTS AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
MEANS AND ENDS
If you haven’t been reading the federalism literature of late, you might be
asking yourself what the “nationalist school of federalism” is in the first place.
Don’t nationalists believe in centralization and federalism’s stalwarts believe
in devolution? How, then, can a nationalist believe in giving power to the
states?
If you’re thinking that a nationalist account of federalism is an oxymoron,
don’t worry. These common-sense questions reveal the core assumption that
undergirds both camps and tee up my first analytic point.6 Each side has made
the same assumption about means and ends. They’ve assumed that devolution
promotes state-centered ends and centralization promotes nationalist ones.
Indeed, each side has fought passionately for devolution or centralization based
on its faith in that simple hypothesis. The emergence of the nationalist school
of federalism, however, has unsettled this long-standing premise of the
nationalism/federalism divide.
A.

The Core Assumption Undergirding Federalism Debates

The easy challenge, I suppose, would be to insist that there shouldn’t be
any camps at all in federalism debates. After all, both devolution and
centralization are properly understood as means, not ends. The question is what
end do they serve? And the most plausible answer is that devolution and

6. Portions of this Part have been adapted from Gerken, supra note 4.
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centralization are means to the same end: a well-functioning democracy,7
perhaps even a well-functioning union.8
So why camps? It’s not just that the end—a well-functioning democracy—
is a complicated and delicate instrument. It’s also that there are many, many
sensible justifications for moving decisions up or down the governance
hierarchy. If we were just quibbling about means, views on devolution ought to
be highly contextual and fall along a broad continuum. If we were just
quibbling about means, these questions could only be worked out on a case-bycase basis, and disagreements would concern matters of degree. We’d see the
kinds of debates among law professors that we see among functionally oriented
political scientists and economists, who dutifully work through arguments
about externalities and economies of scale for every issue. What we see instead
are clearly defined intellectual camps with firm commitments to a single
institutional design strategy across policymaking spheres.
Part of the problem is that we aging boxing club members tend to move so
quickly to the heart of our disagreement—how best to protect our democracy—
that means sometimes bleed into ends during the discussion. Federalism
stalwarts, for instance, often write as if the whole point of the doctrine is to
protect state power, full stop, rather than to protect the right forms of state
power in the right situations. They write as if we ought to have a one-way
ratchet in favor of state power even if we all know they don’t really believe
that.9 The traditional nationalists are just as guilty on this front. They are all
but allergic to anything having to do with state and local power and often
deploy a one-way ratchet of their own even if they, too, would acknowledge a
role for the local when pressed.

7. I take that premise to be implicit in federalism doctrine itself. If you carefully examine
our working list of the basic purposes states are thought to serve, it is woefully incomplete but
plainly depicts states in service of a well-functioning democracy. Indeed, you might well think
that federalism has always served nationalist goals. The laboratories of democracy, for instance,
plainly benefit national ends. So, too, the notion that states facilitate choice or serve as bulwarks
of liberty is attractive to anyone aiming for a well-functioning national democracy.
8. See ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM
(2010).
9. I got a taste of it this last year when I presented a paper on the political safeguards of
horizontal federalism. See Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of
Horizontal Federalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 57 (2014). Many readers had trouble processing the
idea that politics could safeguard interstate relations. Having consumed a fair amount of
federalism scholarship, they took the purpose of the safeguards to be protecting state power (and
thus couldn’t see how safeguards could work at the horizontal level). A moment’s thought makes
clear that this position is muddleheaded, not to mention flatly inconsistent with the position of the
leading scholars of process federalism, from Wechsler to Kramer to Young. Id. at 67–68.
Nonetheless, the idea of a one-way ratchet is sufficiently dominant within the discourse that
people typically equate favoring federalism with favoring state power.
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At this point, every law professor is putting together the best case for
clearly delineated camps and one-way ratchets. For those unfamiliar with
academic habits, the go-to scholarly move is to insist on the three c’s: context,
complexity, and contingency. But academics are anything if not a fourth “c”—
contrarians.
I should emphasize to the contrarians reading this Article that I’m not
aiming for the easy target. I know there is a much more serious argument for
camps than the crude means-bleeding-into-ends definitions of federalism and
nationalism. The positions of the two camps are more nuanced and their
arguments more serious. Proponents of federalism and nationalism don’t just
disagree about means; they disagree about ends—about what kind of
democracy we want.
For federalism’s stalwarts, the decentralization equation is straightforward.
Their ideal is a state-centered democracy, one that emphasizes state power,
state politics, and state polities. Given that end, they worry that the federalstate balance has tilted too far to the federal side. On this view, a one-way
ratchet toward state power—or, at least, a camp—is appropriate because states
have lost so much authority over the years that we need to shore them up
wherever we can.
The traditional nationalists, of course, subscribe to a different vision of
democracy: one that emphasizes national power, national politics, and a
national polity. They are also skeptical of state and local power because they
associate both with the dreaded “-isms” of these debates (cronyism,
parochialism, and, worst of all, racism). That’s why there’s a nationalist camp.
I think that both camps have an outdated conception about the ends of
federalism, something I’ll discuss in the second half of this Article. But for
now, I want to take on what both camps assume to be the nondebatable part of
the analysis: the link between means and ends. For federalism stalwarts, the
equation is simple: devolve power to the states, and you serve state-centered
ends. For traditional nationalists, the argument is just as straightforward:
centralize, and you serve nationalist ends.
B.

Why the New Nationalists Have Undermined the Core Assumption of the
Federalism/Nationalism Debate

Enter the new nationalists, who insist that devolution can further
nationalist aims.10 As I’ve written elsewhere, the new nationalists have shown

10. Some have tried to show the converse—that centralization can serve state-centered
interests by helping states overcome spillovers, take advantage of economies of scale, and the
like. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 1 (2008); David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J.
377 (2001); Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory
of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2010). Arguably, this debate dates back centuries,
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that devolution can “improv[e] national politics, strengthen[] a national polity,
better[] national policymaking, entrench[] national norms, consolidat[e]
national policies, and increas[e] national power.”11 If that’s the case, then we
need to dispense with camps, or at least reorient the debate.12
So how does devolution further traditional nationalist aims? I can’t
possibly cover the whole terrain, but let me give you some examples. Before
turning to those examples, I should emphasize that the sort of
“decentralization” nationalists are describing may be sheared of sovereignty,
but it isn’t the sort of decentralization we associate with GM or McDonalds.13
Instead, it’s one in which state and local officials serve two masters, not one.
That’s because state officials rely on a separate power base, one that boasts a
political makeup quite different from that of the center.
Much of the work of the new nationalists has focused on what I call “the
discursive benefits of structure”14—the ways that structural arrangements help
us work through normative disagreement, accommodate political competition,
and tee up national debates. To grasp how this works, think about the debates
over health care, abortion, immigration, voter ID, same-sex marriage, or
as early Anti-Federalists favored commandeering in order to preserve local power and
opportunities for local resistance. See, e.g., LACROIX, supra note 8, at 7–8.
11. Gerken, supra note 4, at 1893.
12. I should offer a caveat. For several years, I have argued that it’s possible to be a
nationalist who believes in federalism, and one can certainly spot such scholars in the academy.
See ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009). More recently, a few scholars have “outed” themselves as
members of the nationalist school. See Feature Contents, Federalism as the New Nationalism, 123
YALE L.J. 1888 (2013); see also Gerken, supra note 40 (outlining the basic tenets of the school).
But our works builds off the work of many, many people who have been writing for a good, long
while. In this Article, then, I am roping these unsuspecting souls into our project even though
none has characterized his or her work in this fashion and some would surely object. So when you
read the phrase new nationalists, please remember that I’m talking both about those who have
self-consciously identified themselves as such and those who have never put themselves forward
in this fashion but whose work, in my view, fits within the framework I’m offering. Given Ed
Rubin’s presence at the symposium, it’s worth noting that I include him in this group. Although
his article with Malcolm Feeley jumpstarted a different debate than this one, it anticipates some
of the arguments made by the new nationalists in a brief aside about the growth of national
power. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 5, at 923–33 (noting that the growth of the national
government can “increase[] the diffusion of administrative power by adding a second decisionmaker” to the state-dominated process and thereby “introduce new standards, subject old ones to
debate, [and] increase popular awareness”). Rubin and Feeley also remarked upon the
significance of the increasing number of cooperative federal regimes, id. at 933–34, although they
did not pursue these questions as they had other fish to fry.
13. Rubin is correct when he notes in his contribution to this Symposium that I prefer to
“honor [our] self-designation” as “federalism” rather than challenge it, Edward L. Rubin,
Federalism as a Problem of Governance, Not of Doctrinal Warfare, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1117,
1123 (2015), but what we are both describing are the virtues of a decentralized system.
14. Gerken, supra note 4, at 1894.
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marijuana. The work on the discursive benefits of structure shows how, in
Cristina Rodríguez’s words, federalism “amplifies the polity’s capacity for
politics.”15
My work, for instance, has looked to the benefits that federalism affords
democracy’s outliers—racial minorities and dissenters—by supplying them
with a chance to turn the tables, wield the power of the majority, protect
themselves rather than look to the courts for solace, and set the national
agenda.16 On this view, rights and structure have served as “interlocking gears”
moving our democratic projects forward.17 Jessica Bulman-Pozen has cast
states as the “robust scaffolding” needed for national politics to flourish.18
Cristina Rodríguez has depicted state and local governments as sites for
working out disagreements that are too difficult to rehearse on a national
stage.19
This and other works show how states and localities serve an integrative
role, pulling outsiders into the system20 and helping us manage cultural change
and democratic conflict.21 But note that this is decidedly a nation-centered
account. Our work does not depict states as separate and independent
regulatory arenas that allow us to settle our disagreement by retreating to our
comfortable red and blue enclaves. Instead, the new nationalists imagine states
and localities as sites for working out conflict and waging the fight over
national values and national politics.

15. Cristina M. Rodríguez, Federalism and National Consensus 4 (Oct. 2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
16. Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005) [hereinafter
Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding]; Heather K. Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, 62 DUKE L.J.
1349 (2013) [hereinafter Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty]; Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order
Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099 (2005) [hereinafter Gerken, Second Order Diversity];
Heather K. Gerken, The Loyal Opposition, 123 YALE L.J. 1958 (2014) [hereinafter Gerken, Loyal
Opposition]; Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the
Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010) [hereinafter Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down].
17. Heather K. Gerken, Windsor’s Mad Genius: The Interlocking Gears of Rights and
Structure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 587, 588 (2015).
18. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1081 (2014). For
a different but related take on the relationship between federalism and political conflict, see David
Brian Robertson, Federalism and the Making of America 1–3 (2011) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
19. Rodríguez, supra note 15; see also Cristina M. Rodríguez, Negotiating Conflict Through
Federalism: Institutional and Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094 (2014).
20. See Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 16, at 47–48 (discussing
federalism’s centripetal effects).
21. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 18; Rodríguez, supra note 15. For an ambitious new book
attempting to situate American federalism in the field of American political development and
sounding many of these themes, see Robertson, supra note 18.
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Devolution also serves a number of more technocratic aims for the new
nationalists, as environmental federalism scholars have shown.22 This
scholarship moves well past the tired laboratories of democracy account to
identify the policymaking benefits associated with devolution, including
mutual learning, iterative regulation, helpful redundancy, and healthy
competition.23

22. This work dates as far back as Robert M. Cover’s The Uses of Jurisdictional
Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981), though it
was made prominent by Robert Schapiro and environmental law scholars like Bill Buzbee and
Erin Ryan. See ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN (2011) [hereinafter
RYAN, TUG OF WAR]; David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case
Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796 (2008);
William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and Institutional Determinism, 21
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (1997); William W. Buzbee, Interaction’s Promise:
Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145
(2007); Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097
(2009); John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV.
1183 (1995); Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental
Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95
MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996); Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Regulatory Co-Opetition, in
REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 30
(Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem
Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189 (2002); Erin Ryan,
Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Ryan, Negotiating Federalism];
SCHAPIRO, supra note 12. This work displays deep continuities with the more technocratic
threads of classic federalism theory, particularly the notion that the states are useful because they
serve as laboratories of democracy. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
23. Dynamic federalism, iterative federalism, polyphonic federalism, negotiated federalism,
relational federalism—all are terms designed to capture the ways in which state regulation
improves federal regulation, and vice versa. See sources cited supra note 22; see also Robert B.
Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863 (2006); Erwin Chemerinsky, Federalism
Not as Limits, But as Empowerment, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1219 (1997); Gillian E. Metzger,
Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2011); Gillian E. Metzger,
Federalism Under Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 567 (2011); Samuel J. Rascoff, The Law of
Homegrown (Counter)Terrorism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1715 (2010); Daniel Richman, The Past,
Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, in 34 CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF
RESEARCH 377 (Michael Tonry ed., 2006); Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism
in the Age of Terror, 64 STAN. L. REV. 289 (2012); Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law,
Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692
(2001). The new nationalists have even offered a friendly amendment to the laboratories
argument, with Gluck showing that cooperative federal regimes can be the best catalysts of local
experimentation, Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996 (2014), and
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Charles Tyler, and I exploring its political dimensions. Heather K. Gerken
& Charles Tyler, The Myth of the Laboratories of Democracy (2014) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author); see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 18, at 1124–29.
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The new nationalists have also identified the benefits that accrue from the
more combative regulatory role that states play in our system. This work
provides a thicker and more realistic account of the role states play in checking
federal overreach than conventional federalism’s trope about states’ serving as
bulwarks of liberty. Federalism scholars haven’t found much of a middle
ground between the anodyne (states competing for the hearts and minds of
their citizens) and the alarming (armed rebellion). The new nationalists,
however, have shown how state implementation of federal schemes facilitates
much more varied and useful forms of resistance. For instance, Jessica
Bulman-Pozen and I have shown the ways in which cooperative federalism is
paired with uncooperative federalism,24 introducing dissent and debate inside
the Fourth Branch and thereby promoting what we call the “federalist
safeguards of administration.”25 Bulman-Pozen has taken the idea in an even
more interesting direction, showing how administrative integration allows
states to play a crucial role in defending congressional prerogatives, checking
executive overreach, and safeguarding the separation of powers.26 Here again,
these are decidedly traditional nationalist concerns.
The new nationalists have even shown that devolution serves not just
national interests writ large, but the self-interest of national actors—those
concerned with their own political fates rather than the fate of the nation. Abbe
Gluck has identified the counterintuitive ways in which devolution can
entrench federal power rather than dilute it. When Congress uses states to
implement federal law, state participation helps “entrench” the statutory
regime and invests more political actors in its success.27 Delegating power to
state agencies even allows the federal government to engage in what Gluck
terms “field claiming:”28 easing federal entry into “a field of lawmaking
traditionally governed by the states.”29 So, too, Rodríguez has demonstrated
how federal lawmakers deliberately let the states move issues forward in
circumstances in which national actors cannot. Self-interested national actors,
for instance, have been delighted to have states doing the basic legwork on
topics like same-sex marriage and marijuana legalization.30

24. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J.
1256 (2009).
25. Id. at 1286.
26. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 459 (2012).
27. Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 538, 569,
572–74 (2011).
28. Id. at 543.
29. Id. at 565.
30. Rodríguez, supra note 15, at 30, 58.
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Decentralization can even empower racial minorities and dissenters, the
two groups whose fate is always invoked by traditional nationalists to justify
centralization.31 This fear of the local is outdated, an adjective I take some
pleasure in using given how often the traditional nationalists have rebuked
their federalism brethren for failing to keep up with the times. I understand
taking a firm nationalist position during the Civil Rights movement, when
federalism was a code word for letting racists be racists. But it’s a mistake to
continue to equate “Our Federalism” with our father’s federalism. Federalism
has empowered racial minorities and dissenters in a fashion that rights alone
could never achieve.32 Federalism thus compensates for the shortcomings of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.33 And where federalism fails, rights
often succeed. That’s why federalism and rights have served as “interlocking
gears,” moving our grand democratic project forward.34 Claims to a right and
demands for equality are offered in the realm of politics and then instantiated
in the realm of governance. Debate leads to organizing, which leads to
policymaking, which in turn provides a rallying point for still more debate and
organizing and policymaking. When the process of change involves both rights
and governance, social movements include pragmatic insiders, forging
bargains from within, and principled outsiders, demanding more and better
from without. The key point to emphasize, however, is that federalism—far
from being the enemy of rights—supplies the policymaking gears that are all
but essential for any rights-based movement to move forward.
The gears of change don’t always move forward on the rights35 or the
structural side of the Constitution. But that brings me to the second respect in
which “Our Federalism” is not our father’s federalism. If you’re worried about
those places where structural sites serve as gears to push us backwards, it’s
useful to remember that the Rehnquist Court’s federalism revolution has been a
failure. Despite many skirmishes and some genuine defeats—Shelby County36
being the most gut-wrenching—the traditional nationalists are winning the war
over constraints on federal power. The federal government can step in, one
way or another, when the need arises.37 That means we can use

31. To be sure, protecting and empowering racial minorities and dissenters is not solely a
traditional nationalist aim: I take it to be a concern for all of us. But the traditional nationalists
have long invoked the dangers decentralization poses to democracy’s outliers as a justification for
their one-way ratchet.
32. I’ve written a lot about this question before and won’t rehash it here. For a sampling, see
sources cited supra note 16.
33. Gerken, Loyal Opposition, supra note 16; Gerken, supra note 17.
34. For development of this idea, see Gerken, supra note 17.
35. See just about all the Supreme Court race cases of the last twenty years.
36. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (striking down the coverage
formula for section 5 of the Voting Rights Act on federalism grounds).
37. As I’ve written elsewhere:
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decentralization to empower what I call our loyal opposition while checking
our disloyal one.38
This is just a sampling of work that has already filled dozens and dozens of
law reviews. But it shows why the new nationalists’ work fits so uneasily with
traditional federalism debates. All of this work gives the lie to the easy
equation of decentralization with state-centered values and centralization with
nationalist ones. To be sure, the new nationalists don’t claim that
decentralization always serves nationalist values. That would be a foolish
claim. But the new nationalists have shown that it is just as foolish to think that
decentralization always serves state-centered values. If devolution can further
both state-centered ends and traditional nationalist ends, then the question to
centralize is always a complicated, context-sensitive question even if you care
only about national culture, national politics, and national citizenship. So, too,
the simple equation of federalism’s stalwarts—devolution furthers statecentered ends—isn’t as linear as we have thought. The camps, in other words,
have pitched their tents on shaky ground.
I should note that the work of the new nationalists doesn’t just pose an
analytic challenge for traditional federalism debates; it poses a methodological
one as well. For years, scholars have written as if it were possible to balance
the costs and benefits of decentralization on a scale and come up with a rule
that should apply across different regulatory silos. That was a complex inquiry
to be sure, but at least the causal arrow held constant. As I note in Part III, the
new nationalists have introduced a new level of nuance and complexity to
these debates by suggesting that the causal arrows move in both directions.
II. A COMPROMISE ON ENDS?
But still, you might be thinking: maybe we have to be more careful about
causal claims, maybe we should expand our list of the democratic ends states
serve, maybe it’s a mistake to think that decentralization serves only statecentered ends. But we are playing the long game here. We are worried about
averages. You might still think that, on average, devolution serves states and
centralization serves the national government. We will still divide into camps,
then, because our ends will forever divide us. That’s certainly what I thought at

Congress has a ready-made workaround to bypass the anticommandeering doctrine, it can
usually write in a jurisdictional element to satisfy United States v. Lopez, it can borrow a
page from Justice O’Connor’s ‘drafting guide’ to fit its regulations within the ambit of
Gonzales v. Raich, it can turn to its taxing power when the Commerce Clause won’t do,
and it will presumably have no trouble evading the dictates of NFIB (unless the Court
lends some oomph to its Spending Clause ruling).
Heather K. Gerken, Slipping the Bonds of Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 85, 90–91 (2014).
38. Gerken, Loyal Opposition, supra note 16, at 1991–93.
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first, but the work of the new nationalists has led me to question my own
views.
Here, I come to my second claim about the new nationalists’ place in
federalism debates. It’s an empirical and normative claim rather than an
analytic one, and it goes to ends rather than means. The second reason that the
work of the new nationalists should shift existing battle lines is that they have
put forward a distinctive picture of federal-state relations, one that neither
camp anticipated. The work has drawn attention to an important form of state
power neglected by both camps, and it has offered a different vision of what
constitutes a thriving national democracy. These claims are both descriptively
convincing and normatively attractive—that sweet spot for legal scholarship—
and should thus supply a common ground for members of both camps. If you
buy these arguments, then it’s clear we’ve been fighting our battles on the
wrong terrain.
Let me dwell for just a moment on the point about descriptive accuracy.
Even if academics have radically different normative visions of what our
democracy is supposed to look like—so radically different that no compromise
could possibly satisfy either side—I’m still not sure it’s enough to justify the
existence of camps. Imagine, for instance, that some of us want to return to the
Articles of Confederation and some of us want to be France. Even so,
federalism has always been a field—and law has always been a discipline—in
which you can answer a normative question with an empirical answer. While
our work is always inflected by the model of the democracy we wish we had,
legal scholarship’s bread-and-butter has been devoted to perfecting the
democracy we actually have. And I have trouble imagining that any scholar of
federalism—no matter what her affiliations—isn’t interested in improving the
democracy we actually have.
To be sure, the question of how to “perfect” our existing democracy might
just reproduce the same debate over differing visions of democracy. But that
would require a pretty robust confidence that decisions to devolve or centralize
this or that program are going to effect a radical change in our system,
overcoming long-standing regulatory trends, cultural and media forces, and,
most importantly, the tides of politics. I simply don’t share that confidence.
The empirics matter here, then, even if you don’t buy my normative gloss.
I can imagine the collective groan coming from the aging boxing club
members at this point. You’re thinking that we’ve had this debate, right?
Traditional nationalists have long answered federalism supporters’ normative
pleas with an empirical answer, insisting that a state-centered vision of
democracy is a fantasy, that we have national identities but not state ones, that
ours is a homogenous political culture in which citizens’ loyalties lie only with
the nation. We’ve spent a fair amount of time battling over whether we are
purple or red and blue, whether malls in every city look the same, and whether
Texans’ love of their state embodies a deep truth about identity or simply a
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bout of collective insanity. The debate has been fueled by the same kind of
provocation I offer today—one put forward by Ed Rubin and Malcolm
Feeley39—and has generated some of the best titles in the field.40 This
empirical debate has been so heated and so thoroughly canvassed that it’s not
clear how much more there is to say.41
It’s also not the empirical debate I’m interested in having. As long as we
have lumpy residential patterns, interest-group competition will ensure that
federalism achieves its aims whether or not locally concentrated interests
affiliate with the governance sites they are using to push their agendas. The
debate I’m interested in having, then, is not whether state identity is tied up
with those political fights, but what federal-state relations look like today.
The vision of federal-state relations that undergirds the work of the new
nationalists is one in which the states and federal government regulate cheek to
jowl, sometimes leaning on one another and sometimes deliberately jostling
each other. It’s one in which the federal government can regulate where it sees
fit and yet the states retain a vibrant and important role. It is one where the
national government can and does regulate, and yet the states haven’t been
displaced—far from it. Function does not always follow form, and power does
not always follow the exercise of jurisdiction. Even when the national
government intervenes, it rarely displaces the states and regularly empowers
them. As a result, the states play a vibrant and robust role in this regime not as
separate or autonomous sovereigns, but as key parts of an integrated and
interconnected regime.
Two major themes undergird the new nationalists’ descriptive work. The
first highlights a form of state power quite different from the sovereignty or
autonomy accounts that have dominated the thinking of federalism’s stalwarts.
The second describes a thriving nationalist democracy in substantially different
terms than traditional nationalists have deployed.
A.

A Different Account of State Power

The new nationalists have drawn attention to a distinctive form of state
power. Federalism scholars typically gravitate to one of two accounts of state
power: sovereignty or autonomy. While the two are always depicted as
competing accounts, my own view is that they are little different from one

39. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 5.
40. Compare, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Volk of New Jersey? State Identity,
Distinctiveness, and Political Culture in the American Federal System (Feb. 24, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), with Edward L. Rubin, Puppy Federalism and the
Blessings of America, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 37 (2001).
41. Though the always-interesting Bulman-Pozen has found something new to say, as is her
wont. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 18, at 1109–22 (discussing the connection between partisan
identity and state affiliation).
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another.42 An autonomy account is softer around the edges and does not
demand formal judicial protections, which makes it easier for law professors to
stomach it. At bottom, however, it rests on the same basic conception of state
power, one in which states preside over their own empire and regulate free
from federal interference.43
1.

The Power of the Servant

The new nationalists have thoroughly documented a quite different form of
state power, one that rests on neither sovereignty nor autonomy. I call it the
“power of the servant”44 to emphasize that it stems from what amounts,
formally or informally, to a principal-agent relationship. I also use that term
deliberately to provoke federalism’s stalwarts in the hope that they will shake
loose the foolish notion that the states cannot be powerful unless they are
presiding over their own empires. As I note in Part IV, I don’t intend the
“power of the servant” to suggest that states lack any form of autonomy or
discretion. Agents have long enjoyed some measure of autonomy and
exercised some measure of discretion despite the presence of a principal, as
fields ranging from corporate law to administrative law have made clear. That
observation holds especially true where, as here, state agents serve two
masters, not one.45 States are powerful in large part because they are supported
by a separate power base and answer to a state polity, not just a federal one.46
But they are not wielding power as sovereigns, ruling separate and apart from
the national government and able to regulate entirely as they see fit. Instead,
they are embedded inside a larger, national regime in which they do not hold a
regulatory trump card.
It is by now a trope in many fields that the state and federal governments
govern shoulder-to-shoulder in a tight regulatory space. When one moves, the
other moves with it. This work suggests that the old debates in federalism—the
sovereignty/autonomy debate in particular, where the aging boxing club
members are still out in full force—are fast becoming beside the point. Both
the sovereignty and autonomy account depend on open regulatory space for the
states to govern freely, and there’s not much of it left anymore. National
regulations have washed across virtually all of the states’ shorelines.

42. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 16, at 11–21.
43. Id.
44. Heather K. Gerken, Of Sovereigns and Servants, 115 YALE L.J. 2633, 2635 (2006)
[hereinafter Gerken, of Sovereigns and Servants]; see also Gerken, Federalism All the Way
Down, supra note 16, at 11–21, 35–43.
45. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 16, at 40–44.
46. Ernest A. Young, Modern-Day Nullification: Marijuana and the Persistence of
Federalism in an Age of Overlapping Regulatory Jurisdiction, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015).
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Before I lose federalism’s stalwarts, let me hasten to add that none of this
is to say—as a conventional traditional nationalist would have it—that the
states are either irrelevant or swamped by the tides of federal power. Just the
opposite is true. Scholars like Richard Epstein, who insist that the states have
lost too much authority over the last few decades,47 have overlooked the
immense power states wield by virtue of being part of the federal system. It’s
odd that this vision of state power has been neglected by law professors for so
long given that entire fields—administrative law, corporate law—worry
incessantly about how much power the agent wields against the principal. Just
think about how the welfare-to-work debate unfolded or how the Affordable
Care Act has been implemented. Read just about anything written in
environmental law these days. The states play a robust and crucial role in the
regulatory process despite the ubiquity of national regulation. The states and
federal government are regulating together, with the federal government often
depending heavily on states to implement federal policy.48
Ours is thus a state of affairs that members of both camps failed to predict
and that some continue to resist. Federalism’s stalwarts have insisted that the
states are losing power, but that’s only because they refuse to recognize
cooperative federalism as federalism at all.49 And the traditional nationalists
miss how powerful state agents can be in a principal-agent relationship.
Or maybe, as I’ve speculated elsewhere,50 both camps have just been using
the wrong metaphor. If you think of states as autonomous islands in a sea of
federal regulation, you will fear that federal tides will swamp the states and
want to build a levee to hold them back. If you think the ocean is all that
matters, you miss how much life exists beneath its waves. We should imagine
states not as isolated islands, but as reefs. There may be federal water, water
everywhere, but the states still thrive. That’s because states are sites of power.
Just as ancient wrecks and scuttled ships attract all manner of ocean life, sites
of power quickly attract all manner of political life. Political power attracts
political interests, and a political ecosystem springs up around them. Federal
power flows through these reefs, to be sure, but states continue to nurture
worlds of their own.

47. Richard A. Epstein & Mario Loyola, Saving Federalism, NAT’L AFFAIRS, Summer
2014, at 3; see also Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 557, 559
(2000).
48. See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 27.
49. See sources cited supra note 47.
50. This paragraph is adapted from Gerken, supra note 37, at 116.
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Cooperative Federalism Without Its Formal Markers: Crime,
Education, and Family Law

Thanks to the new nationalists, this is by now a familiar point in many
arenas. But if anything, the new nationalists have been too circumspect in
describing this reality. The vast majority of the work on this issue—mine
included—has focused on areas where we can identify the formal markers of
federal-state arrangements and trace its interactions through conventional legal
sources. Cooperative federalism regimes are the most obvious example51—the
places where, to use Gluck’s turn of phrase, federalism comes “by the grace of
Congress”52 and federal-state relations can be traced through federal statutes
and regulations. With its many rules about abstention, comity, and the like, the
relationship between state courts and federal courts is another area legible to
law professors. Here, Schapiro has analyzed these issues in the greatest
depth.53
The mistake we’ve made, then, is the law professor’s mistake. We haven’t
looked closely enough at areas that lack the formal markers of federal-state
cooperation, areas where we can’t trace federal-state interactions through
traditional legal sources. When you begin to look at these areas, though, you
realize that the new nationalists’ arguments apply even to areas of traditional
state concern and to areas thought to belong to the federal government alone. If
the new nationalists’ claims extend that far, the traditional debates over
sovereignty and autonomy—which have dominated federalism debates—may
matter for a small and increasingly irrelevant part of “Our Federalism.”
The most convincing way to make this point is to look to the “statiest” of
state arenas, those consistently defined by the Court as part of the states’
“police powers”: crime, family law, and education. Federalism’s stalwarts have
been most eager to defend these traditional areas of state concern. Yet these

51. There’s been a huge amount of work on environmental federalism. See, e.g., sources
cited supra note 23. Healthcare has also received a good deal of study, especially of late. See,
e.g., Nicole Huberfeld, With Liberty and Access for Some: The ACA’s Disconnect for Women’s
Health, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1357 (2013); Theodore W. Ruger, Health Policy Devolution and
the Institutional Hydraulics of the Affordable Care Act, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE
SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 359 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013);
Gluck, supra note 48. We’ve also seen work on telecommunications, Weiser, supra note 23, and
financial regulation. Katherine Mason Jones, Federalism and Concurrent Jurisdiction in Global
Markets: Why a Combination of National and State Antitrust Enforcement Is a Model for
Effective Economic Regulation, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 285 (2010); see also Ahdieh, supra
note 23.
52. Gluck, supra note 27, at 542.
53. See, e.g., SCHAPIRO, supra note 12.
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domains share many of the features of formal cooperative regimes that
federalism’s stalwarts either ignore or disparage.54
Crime is my favorite example. Policing is, of course, at the heart of the
states “police powers.”55 But even here we see substantial federal-state overlap
and intergovernmental cooperation. Criminal law isn’t the exception that
proves the rule about joint regulation. It is the rule.
Criminal law specialists haven’t missed the fact that federal officials have
thrust their fingers into the policing pie. Many have, in fact, mourned the socalled “federalization” of criminal law. Federal legislation, after all, has
stretched so far into traditional state arenas that some of the field’s top scholars
believe that “the difference between the substantive reach of federal criminal
law and that of state criminal law has virtually disappeared.”56
But note, here again, the law professor’s mistake. Those who have wrung
their hands over this “federalization” of criminal law have missed something
important. Function doesn’t always follow form. Real power does not always
follow its formal exercise. Enforcement does not always follow jurisdiction. It
has been a mistake to assume that criminal law has been federalized merely
because Congress has passed a lot of statutes.
If you look past the sources that are most legible to law professors—to
practice rather than principle, convention rather than code—you will notice
something important. Despite massive amounts of congressional legislation,
states still play a central role in criminal law. State prosecutions have averaged
around ninety-five percent of national criminal felony cases for over a century
and held absolutely steady since the 1980s despite the wave of federal
regulations washing across state shores.57 The reason for this is simple. The
feds don’t have the resources to investigate and prosecute the activities they
have criminalized. Federal dependence on the states is so pronounced that

54. I don’t mean to make the foolish claim that nothing changes when the federal
government steps in. Federal regulations can obviously crowd out state law and the federal
government can put something on state agendas that might not otherwise have appeared. All I
mean to say is that the relationship between the fundamentals hasn’t changed nearly as
dramatically as law professors suggest when they mourn the “federalization” of a domain. To the
contrary, the examples offered show that states retain an important role in administering not just
state policy, but federal law.
55. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2089 (2014) (“Perhaps the clearest example of
traditional state authority is the punishment of local criminal activity.”).
56. DANIEL C. RICHMAN ET AL., DEFINING FEDERAL CRIMES 8 (2014) (emphasis
omitted).
57. Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking Claims of Over-Federalization of
Criminal Law, 62 EMORY L.J. 1, 36, 45 (2012).
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three of the field’s best scholars have classified criminal law as yet another
example of cooperative federalism.58
The marijuana fight showcases the muscular role the states play in criminal
law enforcement even in the presence of pervasive federal regulation. The
federal government has the power to pass regulations; it just doesn’t have the
resources to enforce them.59 The Constitution does not pose an obstacle to
federal intervention or to the uniformity of federal drug policy;60 it’s politics
and resources constraints that matter most.
Many academics have missed the fact that states retain their central role in
criminal law enforcement even as the federal government extends its
regulatory reach. That’s because they assume that function follows form. Like
good law professors, they look to formal instantiations of authority (like
federal legislation) rather than informal evidence of power (like state
prosecution statistics). They read the Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzalez v.
Raich rather than compare the budgets of state and federal prosecutors.
In many ways, this mistake coincides with the larger error made by
scholars of federalism. Because they look only to formal markers of power,
they miss what one might call the “hydraulics” of state power. Even as federal
schemes intrude on what were once largely state domains, the states have
found ways to assert their power informally through networks and informal
relationships and mutual dependence. Our politics have become nationalized,
and yet states still play a vibrant role in national politics.61 The federal
government has extended its statutory reach into traditional state domains like
crime and healthcare, and yet states still find a way to exercise influence
through channels that are less legible to law professors but no less important to
policymakers.62
These broad points hold true in another traditional area of state concern:
education. There has been a huge brouhaha over the “federalization”63 of
58. See Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783, 806–07
(2004); Lauren M. Ouziel, Legitimacy and Federal Criminal Enforcement Power, 123 YALE L.J.
2236, 2261 (2014); RICHMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 8–12.
59. Because the federal government lacks the resources to enforce its own ban on marijuana,
Rob Mikos argues the states are able to “ma[k]e medical marijuana de facto legal within their
jurisdictions” simply by refusing to enforce the federal ban. Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of
Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62
VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1425 (2009). For an astute take on the complex picture of federal-state
relations that the legalization movement reveals, see Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Unbundling
Federalism: Colorado’s Legalization of Marijuana and Federalism’s Many Forms, 85 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1067 (2014).
60. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
61. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 18.
62. Many thanks to Alex Hemmer and Bridget Fahey for pushing me on this point.
63. See, e.g., Michael Heise, The Political Economy of Education Federalism, 56 EMORY
L.J. 125, 126–27 (2006) (“[NCLB] represents a dramatic break from the federal government’s
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education policy due in large part to No Child Left Behind (NCLB)64 and
recent battles over the Common Core.65 But the mistake made by those who
mourn the “federalization” of education policy was to think that function
would follow form. Despite the expanded reach of federal education policy, the
states remain the dominant force in primary and secondary education. That’s
because, notwithstanding the federal government’s formal exercise of
authority, it has run up against just the sort of administrative and political
obstacles that would be instantly recognizable to the new nationalists.
NCLB, for instance, unquestionably altered the administrative structures in
which schools operated.66 But states quickly took advantage of the discretion
afforded to them in this cooperative federal regime to duck federal constraints
by setting testing standards so low they were guaranteed to meet them.67 In the
wake of NCLB’s passage, the federal government attempted to put teeth into
the Act’s regulations68 only to encounter pragmatic resources barriers

traditional posture regarding policymaking for the nation’s public elementary and secondary
schools.”); Id. at 126 (“To remark upon NCLB’s ambitiousness is to remark upon the obvious.”);
Patrick McGuinn, The National Schoolmarm: No Child Left Behind and the New Educational
Federalism, 35 PUBLIUS 41, 57 (“The passage of No Child Left Behind fundamentally changed
the ends and means of federal education policy from those put forward in the original ESEA
legislation, and in so doing created a new policy regime. The old federal education policy regime
was based on a policy paradigm that saw the central purpose of school reform as promoting
equity and access for disadvantaged students. With NCLB, federal education policy has embraced
the much broader goal of improving education for all students by significantly increasing
accountability for school performance.”); Gail L. Sunderman & Gary Orfield, Domesticating a
Revolution: No Child Left Behind Reforms and State Administrative Response, 76 HARV. EDUC.
REV. 526, 526 (2006) (“The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 . . . represents the most
extraordinary expansion of federal power over public schools in American history.”).
64. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
65. Read the Standards, COMMON CORE ST. STANDARDS INITIATIVE, http://www.corestand
ards.org/read-the-standards/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2015).
66. Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 101 (2012)
(“[NCLB] dramatically altered the conditions under which federal K–12 education funding is
made available to the states, adding significant performance and testing requirements.”).
67. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 932 (2004); Kevin Carey, Hot Air: How States Inflate Their Educational
Progress Under NCLB, EDUC. SECTOR (May 2006), http://www.educationsector.org/usr_doc/
Hot_Air_NCLB.pdf. Alabama, for instance, lowered its standard every year in the wake of the
Act’s passage. Kevin Carey, The Pangloss Index: How States Game the No Child Left Behind Act,
EDUC. SECTOR (Nov. 2007), http://www.educationsector.org/usr_doc/The_Pangloss_Index.pdf.
68. Gail L. Sunderman & James S. Kim, The Expansion of Federal Power and the Politics
of Implementing the No Child Left Behind Act, 109 TCHRS. C. REC. 1057, 1068–69 (2007);
Kenneth Wong & Gail Sunderman, Education Accountability as a Presidential Priority: No Child
Left Behind and the Bush Presidency, 37 PUBLIUS 333, 344 (2007) (“[Early on] the Bush
Administration strictly interpreted and enforced the federal requirements and rebuffed any
attempt to introduce policies that would respond to state or local concerns raised about the law.”).
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(specifically a lack of state capacity)69 as well as massive state resistance.70
Because the federal government provides only limited funding71 and plays a
circumscribed role in the education arena, it depended heavily on state and
localities to carry out its policies. Unsurprisingly, then, state resistance and
regulatory evasions eventually forced the Bush administration to give out so
many waivers that it effectively gutted large swaths of NCLB.72
The Obama Administration has spent a fair amount of political capital
pushing back against the pushback. It has been using a combination of federal

69. In the words of one study, “the extent of the opposition to the NCLB” was
“unprecedented in its scope and depth.” GAIL L. SUNDERMAN ET AL., NCLB MEETS SCHOOL
REALITIES: LESSONS FROM THE FIELD 14 (2005). See also Bryan Shelly, Rebels and Their
Causes: State Resistance to No Child Left Behind, 38 PUBLIUS 444, 444–45 (2008) (noting the
unusual level of state resistance for the NCLB); Sunderman & Orfield, supra note 63, at 534
(“The challenge of implementing the NCLB requirements produced angry reactions from state
and local officials.”).
70. Interstate organizations—including the National Conference of State Legislatures and
the National Governor’s Association—as well as individual state legislatures repeatedly attacked
the law. See GAIL L. SUNDERMAN, THE UNRAVELING OF NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND: HOW
NEGOTIATED CHANGES TRANSFORM THE LAW 22 (2006) [hereinafter SUNDERMAN,
UNRAVELING], available at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED490859.pdf; Kristina P. Doan, No
Child Left Behind Waivers: A Lesson in Federal Flexibility or Regulatory Failure?, 60 ADMIN. L.
REV. 211, 215–16 (2008); Andrew Rudalevige, The Politics of No Child Left Behind, EDUC.
NEXT, Fall 2003, at 63, available at http://educationnext.org/files/ednext20034_62.pdf. See also
H.R.J. Res. 192, 2004 Sess. (Va. 2004), available at https://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe
?041+ful+HJ192E; Tom Loveless, The Peculiar Politics of No Child Left Behind, in
STANDARDS-BASED REFORM AND THE POVERTY GAP: LESSONS FOR NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND
253 (Adam Gamoran ed., 2007); SUNDERMAN ET AL., supra note 69, at 13 (quoting the National
Governors Association statement). Some states even filed lawsuits challenging the law, although
these suits were unsuccessful. Connecticut v. Duncan, 612 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2010); Sch. Dist. of
City of Pontiac v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2009); Bd. of Ottawa
Twp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 05 C 00655, 2007 WL 1017808 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2007); Ctr.
for Law & Educ. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 315 F. Supp. 2d 15 (D.D.C. 2004).
71. In the early days of NCLB, for instance, federal funding fell well short of what the states
thought was necessary to implement federal requirements. Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Past,
Present, and Future of Equal Educational Opportunity: A Call for A New Theory of Education
Federalism, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 463–64 (2012) (book review). See also William J. Mathis,
The Cost of Implementing the Federal No Child Left Behind Act: Different Assumptions, Different
Answers, 80 PEABODY J. EDUC. 90 (2005); Sunderman & Kim, supra note 68, at 1072–77.
Moreover, federal funding remains a small fraction of overall educational spending in states and
localities. Joseph Strong, Note, “The Grass Is Always Greener”: A Look at Educational Reform
in the United States and Japan, 21 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 277, 289 (2012).
72. In the words of one study, “[T]he U.S. Department of Education’s [sic] (ED) ha[d] made
such extensive compromises in implementing the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) that
the law’s legitimacy [was] in serious question.” SUNDERMAN, UNRAVELING, supra note 70, at 9.
See also Doan, supra note 70, at 216–18 (describing the expansion of the waiver process); Heise,
supra note 63, at 127 (discussing the Bush Administration’s “defensive” use of a large number of
waivers); Wong & Sunderman, supra note 68, at 345–46.
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grants73 and waivers74 to move toward some modest level of standardization in
states’ education curricula through the Common Core Standards (a goal that
today’s political environment has prevented President Obama from achieving
via formal legislation).75 It’s worth noting, however, that the Common Core
Standards themselves emerged from a state-led process.76 Moreover, even as
the federal government spends some of the political capital necessary to extend
its reach, the Common Core’s day-to-day implementation is still being carried
out by states and localities, and considerable state and local variation
remains.77 While it is too early to offer a final assessment of the success of the

73. RACE TO THE TOP: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. 2 (Nov. 2009),
available at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf. See also Sam
Dillon, States Compete for Federal School Dollars, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2009), http://www.ny
times.com/2009/11/11/education/11educ.html.
74. Letter from Arne Duncan, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Chief State School Officers
(Sept. 23, 2011), available at http://www2.ed.gov/print/policy/gen/guid/secletter/110923.html.
See also Sam Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver After the Health Care Case, in THE HEALTH
CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 227 (Nathan Persily et al.
eds., 2013); Derek W. Black, Federalizing Education by Waiver?, 68 VAND. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015); Sam Dillon, Overriding a Key Education Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2011, at
A12 (terming the waiver program “the most sweeping use of executive authority to rewrite
federal education law since Washington expanded its involvement in education in the 1960s”);
Metzger, supra note 66, at 114–15 (“Faced with tough performance requirements under NCLB
that they could not meet, many states refused to comply and the Department of Education
responded by granting them waivers. These waivers not only exempt states from core features of
NCLB, but they also add new requirements—requirements that the Obama Administration
previously made the basis for grants under the stimulus-funded Race to the Top program and that
the Administration would like to have incorporated in new NCLB reauthorizing legislation . . .
[T]he NCLB waiver program allowed states to signal their refusal to comply and wait for the
political branches of the federal government to respond.”).
75. See DEREK BLACK, EDUCATION LAW: EQUALITY, FAIRNESS, AND REFORM 953 (2013);
Bagenstos, supra note 74.
76. Michele McNeil, 46 States Agree to Common Academic Standards Effort, EDUC. WK.,
June 10, 2009, at 16, available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2009/06/01/33standards.
h28.html; Memorandum of Agreement from the Council of Chief State Sch. Officers and the
Nat’l Governors Ass’n Ctr. for Best Practices on Common Core Standards, available at
http://www.edweek.org/media/commonstandardsmoa.doc (last visited Apr. 26, 2015). See also
Dane Linn, The Role of Governors, in COMMON CORE MEETS EDUCATION REFORM 35, 35–44
(Frederick M. Hess & Michael Q. McShane eds., 2014) (discussing the role state governors
played in the creation, development, and implementation of the Common Core Standards);
Lorraine M. McDonnell & M. Stephen Weatherford, Organized Interests and the Common Core,
42 EDUC. RESEARCHER 488, 491 (2013) (discussing how the developers of the Common Core
Standards sought to maintain distance from the White House, lest they politicize the process,
including even urging President Obama not to condition Title I funding on state adoption of the
standards).
77. See, e.g., PAUL WARREN & PATRICK MURPHY, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL.,
CALIFORNIA’S TRANSITION TO THE COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS: THE STATE’S ROLE IN
LOCAL CAPACITY BUILDING 6–12 (2014), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/re
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Obama Administration’s efforts to influence education policy, it is clear that
states and localities retain their dominant role in education policy. Moreover,
given that “[a]lmost everything that matters” about the Common Core
“depends on what happens next—in other words, on implementation,”78 it’s
hard to imagine that the states and localities implementing the program are
going to lose their sway in the future. Implementation, after all, is precisely
where the power of the servant is at its zenith.
Family law is another example where “federalization” has involved more
bark than bite.79 Justice Kennedy noted in United States v. Windsor that the
“‘regulation of domestic relations’ is ‘an area that has long been regarded as a
virtually exclusive province of the States.’”80 There is even a judicially
invented “domestic relations exception” prohibiting federal courts from
exercising jurisdiction over divorce, alimony, and custody decrees.81 And yet
federal law touches upon familial relations in many ways.82 Even setting aside
judicial decisions striking down state family laws on constitutional grounds
(mostly in the area of substantive due process), family status is regulated
through federal tax law, federal pension law, federal benefits laws, and
immigration law.83 Moreover, the federal government has passed legislation

port/R_414PMR.pdf (comparing California’s implementation of the Common Core Standards to
Kentucky, New York, and Tennessee in relation to professional development activities, the
quality of and access to instructional materials, assessments of the success of the standards, and
the funding provided for implementation). Indeed, studies have found variations even among
individual schools within the same local school district. HEATHER GOLDSWORTHY ET AL.,
CONSORTIUM FOR POL’Y RES. IN EDUC., THE LIVED EXPERIENCE OF STANDARDS
IMPLEMENTATION IN NEW YORK CITY SCHOOLS 2011 (2013), available at http://www.cpre.
org/sites/default/files/researchreport/1496_nycreport.pdf (studying the ways New York City
schools substantially vary their implementations of the Common Core Standards).
78. Frederick M. Hess & Michael Q. McShane, Introduction to COMMON CORE MEETS
EDUCATION REFORM, supra note 76, at 2.
79. I’m indebted to Katherine Silbaugh, Kris Collins, and Linda McClain for a very helpful
discussion about family law during the time in which I was writing about this period.
80. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013) (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)).
81. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 305, 307–08 (2006).
82. In contrast to criminal law, very few people in the field of family law seem to mourn the
federal government’s intrusion, and some even see a larger role for federal intervention. See, e.g.,
Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting for the
Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552 (1999).
83. See Albertina Antognini, Family Unity Revisited: Divorce, Separation, and Death in
Immigration Law, 66 S.C. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2014). For a particularly perceptive work on the
interactive relationship between family law and immigration law, see Albertina Antognini, From
Citizenship to Custody: Unwed Fathers Abroad and at Home, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 405
(2013).
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governing child support,84 family leave,85 child abuse,86 adoption,87 juvenile
care,88 custody determinations,89 abortion,90 and maternal and child health,91 to
name just a few examples.92 As a result, numerous scholars have debunked the
myth of local exclusivity and written about federal intrusion into the domesticrelations sphere,93 with some even showing that federal involvement dates

84. See, e.g., Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Child Support Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-647,
88 Stat. 2337 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651–669 (2012)).
85. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 6381–6387 (2012); 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2012)).
86. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5116i (2012)).
87. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C); Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
88. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat.
1109 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4351–4353, 5038–5042 (2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601–
5784 (2012)).
89. Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3568 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 663 (2012)).
90. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201 (2003)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012)).
91. The federal government offers grants to states to promote maternal and child health. 42
U.S.C. §§ 701–713 (2012). It also established the State Children’s Health Insurance Program
through the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§ 2101–2110, 4901, 111 Stat.
251 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa–1397mm (2012)), and passed the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families through the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, H.R. 3734, 104th Cong. §§ 101–16 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 601–619 (2012)).
92. For more in-depth review of these and other federal statutes, see, for example, Ann
Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the States, 18 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 267, 279–94 (2009). See also Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family
Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1379–82 (1998) [hereinafter Hasday, Federalism and the
Family Reconstructed]; Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825,
879–81 (2004) [hereinafter Hasday, The Canon of Family Law]; Sylvia Law, Families and
Federalism, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 175, 211–20 (2000).
93. See, e.g., JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 17–66 (2014) [hereinafter
HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED]; Libby S. Adler, Federalism and Family, 8 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 197, 211–31 (1999); Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal
Courts, 79 IOWA L. REV. 1073, 1111–15 (1994); Kristin A. Collins, Federalism’s Fallacy: The
Early Tradition of Federal Family Law and the Invention of States’ Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.
1761 (2005); Courtney G. Joslin, Federalism and Family Status, 90 IND. L.J. 787 (2015); Judith
Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619, 644–
46 (2001); Judith Resnik, Reconstructing Equality: of Justice, Justicia, and the Gender of
Jurisdiction, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 393, 415–16 (2002); Emily J. Sack, The Burial of Family
Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 459, 474–76 (2008); Estin, supra note 92; Hasday, Federalism and the
Family Reconstructed, supra note 92; Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, supra note 92, at 870–
81; Law, supra note 92, at 178–85.
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back more than a century.94 While some of this work takes a fairly broadgauged approach to what constitutes “family law,” it confirms that Congress
has its fingers in the domestic-relations pie.
The lesson of criminal law and education law, however, holds true in
family law as well. Despite the passage of numerous federal laws in this area,
the bread-and-butter work of family law is still being carried out by states and
localities. State courts and state agencies still do the bulk of work on domestic
relations—marriages, divorce, alimony, custody, child support, etc.—with
federal courts staying almost entirely out of the domestic relations game. 95
Many federal laws are, in fact, carried out by the states.96 Some federal policies
depend on state courts to succeed.97 Others are implemented through
cooperative federalism with state bureaucracies.98 As Anne Estin has observed,
while many of these programs are “highly centralized,” they are nonetheless
“implemented by the states.”99 As a result, writes Sylvia Law, while the federal

94. See, e.g., Kristin A. Collins, Administering Marriage: Marriage-Based Entitlements,
Bureaucracy, and the Legal Construction of the Family, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1097–1115
(2009) (discussing family law adjudication as early as the nineteenth century); Reva B. Siegel,
She The People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115
HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002) (discussing the relationship between the Nineteenth Amendment’s
passage and state control over domestic relations); Estin, supra note 92, at 274–75 (discussing the
regulation of family life in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries); Hasday, Federalism
and the Family Reconstructed, supra note 92, at 1299 (discussing the development of family law
during Reconstruction).
95. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 305, 307–08 (2006); Meredith Johnson Harbach, Is
the Family a Federal Question?, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 131, 163 (2009) (noting that federal
court reluctance to take on these cases is so pronounced that “the lower federal courts are drifting
toward an expansion of the domestic relations exception to [even] include federal questions”).
96. The states, for instance, play a substantial role in administering federal welfare
programs, Cashin, supra note 82, at 561–62, and federal child support programs, Elizabeth S.
Saylor, Federalism and the Family After Morrison: An Examination of the Child Support
Recovery Act, the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, and a Federal Law Outlawing Gun
Possession by Domestic Violence Abusers, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 82 n.145 (2002). This
generalization does not hold true of all federal programs that touch upon family relations,
however. The federal government, for instance, administers Social Security survivor benefits. See
Collins, supra note 94, 1163–64; see also Goodwin Liu, Social Security and the Treatment of
Marriage: Spousal Benefits, Earnings Sharing, and the Challenge of Reform, 1999 WIS. L. REV.
1, 5–24, 41 (1999) (discussing the treatment of marriage under the Social Security system).
97. See, e.g., Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, supra note 92, at 1380–81
(discussing implementation of the Child Support Enforcement Act and the Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act).
98. See, e.g., Estin, supra note 92, at 281–94 (discussing TANF, the Child Abuse Prevention
and Treatment Act, the Adoption and Safe Families Act, the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act of 1974, the Maternal and Child Health Bureau grant program, and the SCHIP
program); see also Anne Laquer Estin, Federalism and Child Support, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L.
541, 542, 583–86 (1998) (discussing the eligibility for and implementation of TANF).
99. Estin, supra note 92, at 294.
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government has the power to intervene “and often has done,” the states retain
“primary responsibility for the regulation of families.”100 So, too, after
canvassing the evidence of federal regulation of family law mustered by Jill
Hasday in her new book,101 Joanna Grossman’s illuminating review
nonetheless concludes that “[d]espite . . . various forms of federal family law,
it is still by and large true that family law and family status are controlled by
the states.”102 Similarly, Kris Collins describes the “far messier, textured,
interesting reality of the past and present regulation of family law,” one that
defies “neat and tidy jurisdictional lines” between state and federal
authority.103
We can play the game in the federal government’s end zone as well. To be
sure, there are some areas where the federal government governs solo. But
even in areas where the federal government is supposed to exercise exclusive
control, states and localities are actively regulating. Cristina Rodríguez’s work
on immigration federalism gives the lie to the notion of federal exclusivity.104
Benjamin Sachs’s analysis of the role local and state officials play in labor law
makes clear that, despite the clear dictates of the NLRA and exceedingly broad
preemption doctrine, labor law does not lie solely within the federal
government’s province.105 Robert Ahdieh has shown what he terms a
“dialectical regulation” between federal and state officials in the area of
securities regulation.106 Scholars have even claimed that states and localities
play a robust role in national security regulation107 and foreign policy.108 All of
this work looks past the case law on exclusivity, preemption, and the allocation
of authority—the law professors’ traditional sources of information—to
examine what’s actually taking place on the ground.
The descriptive point that has long been made by scholars of
environmental law and other cooperative regimes, then, is an even bigger and
more powerful point. It holds true in the traditional domains of state power and
the “exclusive” domains of federal power. Federal-state interactions plainly
100. Law, supra note 92, at 184.
101. HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED, supra note 93, at 18–19, 39.
102. Joanna L. Grossman, Family Law’s Loose Canon, 93 TEX. L. REV. 681, 690 (2015)
(book review).
103. Kris Collins, Federalism, Marriage, and Heather Gerken’s Mad Genius, 95 B.U. L.
REV. 615, 627 (2015).
104. Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106
MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008).
105. Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Law in Cities and States, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1153 (2011).
106. Ahdieh, supra note 23, at 868.
107. Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 289 (2012); Rascoff, supra note 23.
108. See, e.g., Judith Resnik et al., Kyoto at the Local Level: Federalism and Translocal
Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAS), 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10768 (2010).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1022

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:997

take different forms in these arenas. But these interactions exist along a
continuum, and the underlying pattern is roughly the same. It’s a pattern in
which function doesn’t always follow form, in which the federal government
regulates freely and yet states retain a robust and important role. It’s one in
which the power of the servant is more important than the power of the
sovereign, where integration matters more than autonomy, where the insider’s
influence matters more than the outsider’s independence. It’s also one in which
the central obstacle to uniformity—or even the successful implementation of
federal policy—is politics, not law.
Given law professors’ proclivities, it’s not surprising that the new
nationalists’ work on state power has taken so long to take root. The
sovereignty and autonomy accounts have dominated debates at least in part
because they are easier to trace, easier to theorize, and easier to imagine
instantiating. They rest on independence and separation, not cooperation and
overlap. They involve clear lines of authority and clear jurisdictional divides.
They resonate deeply with a traditional conception of power, one that involves
a principal controlling its agents. Power may be hard to measure for these
accounts, but at least it can be delineated. And these accounts lend themselves
to manageable doctrinal tests, if only because enough is held constant in the
decentralization equation that it’s possible to think through the problem of how
to augment sovereignty and autonomy using traditional legal tools.
The power of the servant, in sharp contrast, is hard to trace, harder to
theorize, and still harder to imagine instantiating. It rests on informal influence
as much as formal power, on the inner workings of a regulatory system as
much as the outer shell of regulations that bind it. And it is a form of power
designed to please neither federalism’s stalwarts nor traditional nationalists.
One side has trouble seeing it as a form of power at all, and it just irks the
other. Needless to say, doctrinal manageability is not its long suit.109
What the “power of the servant” does have going for it is its ubiquity. The
new nationalists have depicted “the power of the servant” as a rival to the
sovereignty and autonomy accounts,110 but we may have reached the point
where the sovereignty/autonomy debate is little more than an academic
sideshow.
3.

A Different Account of a Thriving National Democracy

If the new nationalists’ descriptive work has highlighted an
underappreciated form of state power, it has also painted a different picture of
what constitutes a thriving national democracy. Here, too, the work runs

109. With apologies to John Hart Ely.
110. See, e.g., Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, supra note 16, at 1365–67; Heather K.
Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1557 (2012) [hereinafter Gerken,
Our Federalism(s)].
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against the grain of conventional legal analysis. The traditional nationalists’
view of democratic ends is inflected by a sovereignty account as well, after all.
It’s concerned with the ability of the national government to regulate without
interference and places a high premium on uniformity. It’s a hierarchical
account that assumes the principal should be able to control its agent and thus
eschews the idea that power can be shared, partial, and contingent. It’s a vision
of national power that leads to the moniker “cooperative federalism” for a
complex set of arrangements that generates numerous opportunities for
uncooperative federalism.111 The traditional nationalist account often crowds
out a role for the states and sometimes condemns them as enclaves used to
retreat from national values.
The picture put forward by the new nationalists is quite different. It’s one
in which the federal government can regulate without interference as a formal
matter, but its success depends as much on politics as decrees as a functional
one. Technically the federal government can preside over its own empire, but
practically it relies heavily on the states and thus takes on all of the
fractiousness and messiness associated with that reliance. As noted above,112
it’s a form of decentralization in which state and local officials serve two
masters, not one, and draw their power from a different power base than the
center does.113 This fact makes resistance more likely and successful resistance
more probable. The federal government may be at the helm, but the regulatory
ship is guaranteed to be buffeted by political headwinds.
The new nationalists’ account thus suggests that the primary obstacle to
uniformity isn’t law; it’s politics. When the national government fails to
achieve uniformity, it’s rarely because it lacks legal authority. Instead, the
federal government lacks either the political capital or the political will to
guarantee consistency. Or maybe because—contrary to the conventional
traditional nationalist vision—national leaders believe that disuniformity has
its role to play in a pluralist system like our own.114
Finally, the new nationalists don’t depict states as separate and
autonomous enclaves that facilitate a retreat from national norms. Instead,
states and localities are at the center of the fight over what our national norms

111. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 18.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 12–14, 45–46.
113. To the extent that citizens identify with the states and localities in which they live—or
are at least shaped by the local culture—the dynamic becomes all the more powerful. See, e.g.,
Ernest A. Young, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty as Federalism Strategies: Lessons from the Same-Sex
Marriage Debate, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1133 (2014); Young, supra note 46; David Fontana,
Government by Location 10 (Dec. 15, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
114. For a defense of this notion from the perspective of a social engineer, see Gerken,
Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 16. For a defense of this notion from the perspective of
Congress, see Gluck, supra note 23, at 2014, 2019–20 (cataloging the reasons members of
Congress might prefer the “disuniform implementation of national law”).
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should be. As with a conventional traditional nationalist account, the federal
government still holds the national supremacy trump card. But the federal
government must be circumspect about playing it. If an issue matters for
national values, that fight can be had, and it can be won. The states can be
shoved aside or brought to heel or bribed. But the federal government must
work to do so.
Here again, this vision of federal-state relations isn’t all that congenial to
law professordom. Legal academics generally believe that the principal should
control the agent. Moreover, the limits placed on national power are also far
less legible to us. An endless number of law professors jumped into the fray
over NFIB, waxing eloquent about the Tax Power or the Commerce Clause or
conditional spending—all issues that could be briefed and debated using
traditional constitutional sources. But very few professors have kept an eye on
where the real power struggle is today: the battle over waivers and
implementation.115 These types of fights are hard for the law to describe and
even harder for the law to control.
4.

Is The Game Worth the Candle?

There are two benefits associated with the new nationalists’ descriptive
work, both of which undermine the intellectual terrain on which the camps are
built. First, it happens to be convincing. Indeed, as I argued in Section II.A, it
may even be true of a much wider swath of “Our Federalism” than even those
writing in this area have claimed. That should matter for those who care about
improving the democracy we actually have. If the world has changed,
federalism debates ought to change with it.
It’s not just the descriptive accuracy of this work that makes me skeptical
that pragmatically oriented scholars will remain divided into camps (even if
some of us want to return to the Articles of Confederation and some of us want
to be France). The second reason this work should shift the debate is that it
presents a normatively attractive account of federal-state relations. The
democracy we have—the democracy the new nationalists have described—
represents a reasonably satisfying compromise for both sides. It may be a
different reality than either camp desired, but it is also a different reality than
either camp feared.
Members of the new nationalists have been pretty cagey about their
normative commitments, and I count myself among the worst offenders. Even

115. The handful of scholars who defy the rule include David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In
Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265 (2013); Heather Gerken & Ted Ruger, Real
State Power Means Getting in the Obamacare Game, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 2, 2013),
https://hbr.org/2013/04/real-state-power-means-getting; Bagenstos, supra note 74; Gluck, supra
note 27; and Ruger, supra note 51. Gillian Metzger similarly drew attention to the practice of
waivers in an early piece assessing NFIB’s significance. Metzger, supra note 66, at 112–16.
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when our work has been normatively inflected, we’ve repeatedly declined to
endorse the system as a whole but instead insisted that we’re simply exposing
this or that underappreciated feature of “Our Federalism” and leaving the
balancing test for others to apply. While it’s perfectly natural for a new school
to spend time laying the descriptive groundwork before moving to a normative
claim, it’s probably time for each of us to put her money where her mouth is. It
would be impossible to build a normative case in a few articles, let alone a few
paragraphs. Nonetheless, in order to start putting my money where my mouth
is, let me at least sketch why I think that the democracy we have is also a
democracy we should want.116
If you care about state power, the states are still powerful. While states
can’t block the federal government from invading their turf, they are also
licensed to invade the federal terrain. They may not preside over their own
empires, but they hold sway over large swaths of the federal empire. That
means that states play an important role in shaping not just state law, but
federal law. It means that state and local officials don’t just engage in
cooperative federalism, but uncooperative federalism. They aren’t outsiders to
the behemoth we call the Fourth Branch, but powerful insiders. Their status as
critical parts of federal administration enables them to be critics of the federal
administration. They are still checking the national Leviathan, albeit in entirely
different fashion than traditional federalism scholars have contemplated. States
these days may not look as powerful to the law professor who focuses unduly
on the formal exercise of jurisdiction and unthinkingly assumes that the
principal can always command the agent. But if you focus on conditions on the
ground, you’ll see that states retain their preeminent role. Real power comes
not just from formal legal authority, but from money and manpower, politics
and practice.
The state’s democratic role is just as important as its regulatory one. To be
sure, states may not constitute independent mini-polities, resolving their own
questions entirely as they see fit. But they aren’t just convenient polling places
for national debates, either. Instead, states are the front lines for national
debates, the key sites where we work out our disagreements before taking them
to a national stage. States aren’t pushed aside by national politics; instead, they
“fuel” it.117
If you care about national power and national politics, in contrast, it’s
worth remembering that states retain this important role even as the courts
have permitted Congress to regulate with close to a free hand. The courts
haven’t just left most cooperative federal regimes alone; they’ve also permitted
116. At least in term of federal-state relations. I’m not going to claim that hyperpolarization,
the partisan administration of elections, and a deregulated campaign-finance system are all to the
good.
117. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 18, at 1128–29.
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the “federalization” of traditional areas of state concern, including crime,
family law, and education.118 Nationalists have never begrudged efforts at
decentralization provided that the national government gets to make the call
about when to decentralize. And in almost every instance nowadays, the
federal government gets to make that call.
To be sure, while the national government remains at the top of the
hierarchy, it presides over a Tocquevillian bureaucracy, not a Weberian one.
As a result, the national government must often spend political capital to get its
way even when the law poses no obstacle. The federal government must also
learn how to deal with dissenters; it must even learn how to cut deals with
dissenters. If nationalists are unhappy with that state of affairs, their quarrel
isn’t with our law; it’s with our politics.
Moreover, balanced against those regulatory costs are the benefits we
accrue from structuring our national democracy in this fashion. We benefit
when our Fourth Branch gains a powerful and useful source of dissent in the
states—agents that can provide both a bureaucratic and political reality check.
We benefit from having the states serving as what Jessica Bulman-Pozen terms
a “robust scaffolding” for political competition.119 We benefit from a system in
which structure and rights serve as “interlocking gears,” moving the projects of
debate and integration forward.120 We benefit from the democratic churn that
states and localities provided, from the outlets for pluralism that a
decentralized structure allows.121 Because we have a robust federal system, we
aren’t forced to debate issues on an impossibly large national scale but can
instead begin those conversations in a myriad of sites, all with different
political arrangements and different preconditions for compromise.122 We
aren’t fighting every fight on a national stage, with the winner taking all.
Instead, we’re rehearsing those battles on a smaller scale in an iterative fashion
and in a myriad of political contexts. Our politics may take on greater
complexity, but they aren’t flattened by uniformity, either.
Better yet, we’re not just having those fights in the airy and abstract realm
of political speech, where ideologues and intellectual purity hold sway. We’re
having those fights through sites of governance, where pragmatists dominate,
where accommodation is necessary, where everyone must “pull, haul, and

118. To be sure, the Court occasionally imposes limits on federal power in these areas. See,
e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (family law); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995) (criminal law). But the Court has also supplied ready-made workarounds to
avoid those limits. Gerken, supra note 37.
119. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 18, at 1081.
120. Gerken, Loyal Opposition, supra note 16, at 1991; Gerken, supra note 17.
121. Gerken, supra note 17.
122. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, supra note 16, at 1148–52, 1171–80; Rodríguez, supra
note 15.
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trade,” to borrow Justice Souter’s phrase.123 That picture of a national
democracy loses some of the efficiency and neatness of a centralized system,
but it gains quite a bit in return.
And here’s a fact both camps should remember, one that gets missed by
law professors who look to formal structures, legal guarantees, and
constitutional doctrine to assess how federal-state relations work. What’s
happened in so many of these regulatory arenas is that the states and federal
government have done what they do pretty well: work it out. Tussle and
campaign and negotiate and compromise. Federal-state relationships are forged
in the crucible of politics. And the result has been a robust system in which
states continue to play a crucial role. But states do so as agents and partners in
an interconnected regime rather than as emperors presiding over their own
terrains.
That may not be the stuff of which traditional nationalist or federalist
dreams are made. But it is a reasonable compromise, and a realistic one to
boot. If you are focused on improving the democracy we have, it ought to
supply ample common ground on which to build.
III. THE TERMS AND BENEFITS OF THE DÉTENTE
In sum, the work of the new nationalists pushes toward a détente in two
ways. First, as an analytic matter, it unsettles the grounds on which the existing
camps are built by suggesting that the relationship between means and ends
isn’t as clean or as linear as many have assumed. Second, as a normative and
empirical matter, it points up a plausible common ground for the two sides—
an account of the democracy we have and an account of a democracy we
should want. It has thus created the conditions in which a détente is possible
between the two camps.
A.

The Terms of the Détente

Given what I’ve said, it’s probably not hard to guess at what I think the
terms of the détente ought to be. Traditional nationalists need to start
wondering whether they are the ones behind the times and recognize that states
can further rather than undermine nationalist aims. They need to acknowledge
the crucial role that states and localities can and should play in a thriving
national democracy. They need to concede that disuniformity has a role to play
in forging and maintaining a robust union and a well-functioning
administrative state.
If traditional nationalists need to acknowledge that the power states wield
in our integrated regime is a good thing, federalism’s stalwarts need to
acknowledge that it’s a form of power in the first place. Rather than cling to

123. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994).
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the idea that states need to preside over their own empires to be powerful, it’s
time for federalism scholars to recognize that the principal-agent “problem” is
a feature, not a bug, for anyone who cares about state power. And they must
see states not as enclaves that facilitate a retreat from national norms, but sites
for forging national norms.
Notice, by the way, how the work of the new nationalists would reorient
current debates. For starters, even if we disagree—as I think we will continue
to disagree—about striking the right balance between state and federal power,
at the very least we ought to agree that the simple notions like devolution and
centralization are too crude for current debates.
I suspect this work will also lead champions of sovereignty and autonomy
to think of themselves as allies rather than opponents. As I’ve noted
elsewhere,124 their visions of state power display deep continuities with one
another—both depend on the presence of open regulatory space and the ability
of states to preside over their own empires. They both depend, in other words,
on a sovereignty account despite the efforts of autonomy’s proponents to
distinguish them.
The real challenge to this vision of state power, then, comes from the new
nationalists. They have shown that the most important form of state power
does not involve states’ presiding over their own empires, but administering
the federal one. And they have suggested there isn’t much exclusive regulatory
space out there anymore. Going forward, then, the real battle will be between
the power of the sovereign and the power of the servant.
B.

The Benefits of a Détente: A New Process Federalism

And what is to be gained from a détente?125 Quite a bit. We have all spent
a lot of time winding the same normative arguments around whatever case the
Supreme Court has kicked out to us, be it Printz or Raich or NFIB. But there
are more pressing problems to be resolved, and they’d all benefit from our
collective wisdom. Much of the new nationalists’ work, after all, has been
descriptive. That’s not surprising given that it’s orienting the field around a
different picture of federal-state relations and undermining the core analytic
claim undergirding today’s debates. But the work has come up short when it

124. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 16.
125. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, as well as three of my brightest RA’s—Sundeep Iyer, Rosa Po,
and Zayn Siddique—pressed me on whether camps serve a role even under the circumstances I
describe. Perhaps our collective thinking benefits from having advocates from the far ends of the
spectrum pushing clearly delineated positions. I don’t disagree with this point, but I’m not
worried about it, if only because law professors are stubborn old dogs. While I’d like to see
members of both camps pull up their stakes, I’d be stunned if a fair number of professors didn’t
hammer the stakes of their tents in still deeper.
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comes to what Robert Schapiro calls the “rules of engagement”126—the
doctrinal constraints on federal-state relations that have always been at the
center of federalism debates.
Process federalism provides an apt example. It’s one of the most storied
debates in federalism, and it has absolutely dominated the discussion during
the last few decades. But we need a new process federalism, one tailored to the
evolving nature of state power and the role states play in a thriving national
democracy. The work of the new nationalists confirms that it makes perfect
sense to look primarily to politics to safeguard healthy federal-state relations.
But we’ve focused on safeguarding far too narrow a conception of state power.
As to the first, the discussion above confirms the core insight of the
political process schools: federal-state relations are profoundly shaped by
political forces no matter what formal bounds the Constitution places on state
and federal power. As a formal matter, the national government can regulate
where it sees fit these days, and yet the states retain a powerful place in the
American system. Federal power is more constrained by politics and practice
than by Constitutions and codes.
The problem is that those interested in the political safeguards to protect
state power have not been thinking about the most important form of state
power. Indeed, as far as I am aware, all of the process federalists imagine
politics safeguarding state autonomy, and all of process federalism’s
opponents have focused on the need to protect state sovereignty. Both accounts
depend on the federal government and states regulating independently and
presiding over their own empires. If the autonomy/sovereignty debate is
becoming a sideshow, however, it makes little sense to fight these fights. If
you recognize how state power functions in this day and age, it can’t be that
the purpose of the political safeguards is to help the states and federal
government engage in the governance equivalent of parallel play. In a world
where regulatory overlap is the rule, then, neither side in that debate has
focused on the right question.127
There are a fair number of traditional nationalists who endorse process
federalism, of course, but their account has not kept up with the times either.
The traditional nationalists’ preferred version of the safeguards account is one
in which the courts never step in. That is an utterly unrealistic goal given the

126. Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243,
285 (2005).
127. Jessica Bulman-Pozen’s work suggests that this should have been obvious to the process
federalists from the start. As she points out, some of the best work on this issue is aimed at
leveraging political and administrative integration in the service of state autonomy and
separateness. But, as Bulman-Pozen has astutely observed, the odds are that “integration yields
integration.” Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and
Politics, 123 YALE L.J. 1920, 1922 (2014).
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pervasiveness of federal-state overlap. As Abbe Gluck has shown, the states
have become so deeply intertwined with federal administrative law that courts
must have “rules of engagement” just to carry out their quotidian duties.128
Judicial supervision of federal-state relations is going to occur no matter what.
We can’t expect the judiciary to stop refereeing this game, but we should insist
that it will understand how the game is being played.
I thus assume that the “new” process federalism is going to look more like
Rick Hills’s129 or Ernie Young’s130 preferred variant, in which courts don’t
police federal-state boundaries but play an Elyian role131 in ensuring that the
right conditions of federal-state bargaining obtain. But the new process
federalism should be shorn of the idea that dominates both of their work—that
the point of process federalism is to safeguard state autonomy. Our focus
should be second-order policing of federal-state bargaining,132 not first-order
policing of federal-state boundaries. In this sense, NFIB’s much-maligned
Spending Clause ruling may be a harbinger of the future.133 For all its many
demerits, it represents an effort by the Court to come to grips with the reality
of ongoing federal-state interactions and to set some rules about how they
should unfold over time. But, consistent with the insights of the old process
federalism, judges must be cognizant of the fact that politics will constrain
federal authority far more effectively than judicial decisions.
Note that this “new process federalism” draws upon the wisdom of both
camps. One side has been wrong in thinking that the point of process
federalism is to shore up state autonomy, but it’s been right to think that the
courts have a role to play. The other side has been right to think it’s a mistake
for the Court to engage in first-order policing of federal-state boundaries, but it
is wrong to think that the courts should vacate the field.134
Needless to say, the new process federalism cannot be a one-size-fits-all
account. As I noted earlier, while federal-state relations take a roughly similar
form in many parts of “Our Federalism,” they still fall along a broad
continuum. Family law looks different from environmental law. The
enforcement of criminal law isn’t the same as the administration of the ACA.
Much of the work on these subjects has been confined to doctrinal silos. What

128. Gluck, supra note 23.
129. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998).
130. Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349 (2001).
131. The term comes from Ernie Young. Id. at 1395.
132. Erin Ryan frames it differently, but I take her project to be aimed at just this form of
second-order policing. See, e.g., RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 22; Ryan, Negotiating
Federalism, supra note 22, at 102.
133. For an intelligent discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of Justice Roberts’s effort
to wrestle with the problem of second-order policing, see Metzger, supra note 66.
134. Thanks to Sundeep Iyer for pushing me on this point.
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we need now is an effort to schematize these regulatory arenas so we can trace
their continuities while acknowledging their differences.
Moreover, the new process federalism will necessarily implicate
multidimensional problems involving resource allocation, governance, and
politics. Federalism debates were hard enough when we imagined federalism
battles as one-off problems involving a small number of institutional actors and
the causal arrows pointed in only one direction. But the new process federalists
must figure out how to take these complexities into account—especially the
fact that decentralization can serve nationalist ends—without losing sight of
the core problem.
There are other ways in which process federalism must adapt to the times.
Process federalism has largely focused on the moment when legislation is
passed. To the extent that the timeline was expanded, it’s because sovereignty
types looked to the court battle that followed the passage of legislation, or
because the “soft” process federalism advocates looked to what courts could do
ex ante to shape legislative fights.135 If you imagine federal-state relations as
ongoing and iterative, not one-off battles, then it’s clear that new process
federalism’s timeline must be extended. Just think, for instance, how much has
occurred in the wake of the ACA’s passage. A process account must focus not
only on the moment a statute is passed, but what happens when it is
administered—on what Jessica Bulman-Pozen and I have described as the “ex
ante safeguards of federalism.”136
So too, if you imagine federal-state relation taking place not just on the
Hill or in a court, but in bureaucracies throughout the country, it’s clear that
the new process federalism’s lens must be widened. Given the pronounced
administrative features of federal-state relations these days, it’s not surprising
that some of the best work in the field of late has focused on the administrative
dimensions of federalism.137 As Gillian Metzger astutely observes,
administrative law’s “nonconstitutional and generic character” makes it
“particularly well suited for addressing the central challenge of contemporary

135. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 129.
136. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 24, at 1292.
137. See, e.g., Stuart M. Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis With the Net Down:
Administrative Federalism Without Congress, 57 DUKE L.J. 2111 (2008); Brian Galle & Mark
Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge
of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933 (2008); Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102
MICH. L. REV. 737 (2004); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57
DUKE L.J. 2023 (2008); Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing”
Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125 (2009). Miriam Seifter, a bright newcomer to the field, has written
a series of articles on the topic. See, e.g., Miriam Seifter, Federalism at Step Zero, 83 FORDHAM
L. REV. 633 (2014); Miriam Seifter, State, Agencies, and Legitimacy, 67 VAND. L. REV. 443
(2014); Miriam Seifter, States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100 VA. L. REV.
953 (2014).
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federalism: ensuring the continued relevance of states as regulatory entities in
contexts marked by concurrent federal-state authority and an extensive national
administrative state.”138 While much of that work hews too closely to an
autonomy account for my tastes, it has nonetheless begun to ask some of the
key questions the new process federalism school must answer.139
The task seems daunting, so it might be helpful to offer a few examples of
what the “new process federalism” would look like. Some of it will resemble
Rick Hills’s brilliant piece recasting the anti-commandeering rule as an effort
to ensure the right conditions obtain for federal-state bargaining.140 While Hills
is, in my view, unduly focused on an autonomy account, he models how to do
a deep dive into the economic and political incentives that shape federal-state
bargaining and determine how conditional spending works. Some of it will
resemble Sam Bagenstos’s piece on “federalism by waiver.”141 There he shows
how politics and other forces transformed waivers from interstitial devices to
powerful tools for executive policymaking. Bagenstos’s analysis of the
relationship between NFIB’s spending clause ruling and the president’s waiver
practice shows how complex and fluid federal-state negotiations can be. But
Bagenstos also systematizes the process and identifies its key variables (which
range from the president’s policymaking position to the affinity felt between
state and federal bureaucrats working inside the same system). He thus
manages to think rigorously about how an “iterative, negotiated process, in
which the state holds a number of important cards” will play out in the wake of
NFIB.142 Some of it will look like Erin Ryan’s work, which draws upon
bargaining theory and catalogs federal-state negotiations along a variety of
dimensions.143 Some of it will answer Abbe Gluck’s list of fifteen doctrinal
questions that take place at the intersection of federalism and administrative
law.144 This and other work gives me faith that it’s possible to systematize and
theorize the complexity that the new nationalists have documented.

138. Metzger, supra note 137, at 2090.
139. And note what happens when scholars start thinking about federalism’s administrative
dimensions. They begin to see states as part of an integrated national system, which is why some
of this work has carried us to state courts and stage agencies, see, for example, Abbe R. Gluck,
Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE
L.J. 1898 (2011). Some have looked toward the horizontal distribution of power, Bulman-Pozen,
supra note 26, and some have started to think through “federalism by waiver,” see sources cited
supra note 115. These, too, seem like the natural outgrowths of a new process federalism.
140. Hills, supra note 129.
141. Bagenstos, supra note 74, at 228.
142. Id. at 231.
143. See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 22, at 265–367; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism,
supra note 22.
144. Gluck, supra note 23, at 2022–43.
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IV. A BRIEF RESPONSE TO THE COMMENTATORS
I’ll close simply by offering a few observations about the comments, all of
which managed to be both gracious and critically engaged. I learned an
immense amount from each one, and they have all helped me think more
deeply—and, in some instances, differently—about the claims I made at the
Lecture. To have a group of this caliber engaged with one’s work is a gift,
plain and simple. I am intensely grateful and thus sorely tempted to respond to
each one in depth. But that would turn this Essay into a book, something that
seems like poor thanks to the exceptionally courteous and highly competent
editors of the law review. Secure in the knowledge that we will all be in
conversation with one another for many years to come,145 I’ll try to be thematic
and respond only to the common threads in the comments.
A.

Too Little on Nationalism?

One theme that runs through many of the comments is a demand for a
more fully elaborated theory of nationalism.146 That seems exactly right and
entirely fair. Nationalism already comes in many flavors, as Jessica BulmanPozen points out in her piece.147 Indeed, Bulman-Pozen’s categories map
neatly onto the main debates we’ve had about the scope of national power. For
example, Bulman-Pozen argues that some equate “nationalism” with the power
of the center,148 an account that likely traces back to debates over federal
power in the wake of the New Deal. What Bulman-Pozen describes as the
“unified American polity” account149 likely has roots in the federalism fights
that arose during the Civil Rights Era, when nationalists insisted on the
importance of national norms. And then there’s the school of thought that has
long associated nationalism with uniformity, which may simply be rooted in
our lawyerly penchant for consistency. None of these ideas is capacious

145. There are costs to this approach. First, one ends up neglecting the grace notes in the
comments. For example, Jessica Bulman-Pozen’s observation that “[c]ries for states to secede
from the union or to nullify federal law do not reflect the separation of state and national, but
rather their deep integration,” was, standing alone, worth the price of admission. Jessica BulmanPozen, The Rites of Dissent: Notes on Nationalist Federalism, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1133, 1143
(2015). Second, I’m going to say less about those comments with which I largely agree, like Ed
Rubin’s beautifully crafted and even more beautifully written essay. Edward L. Rubin,
Federalism as a Problem of Governance, Not of Doctrinal Warfare, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1117
(2015). It’s a stroke of good luck to have a scholar as highly respected and sure-footed as Rubin
situate one’s work in the field, and I’m nothing but grateful for it.
146. Abbe R. Gluck, Nationalism as the New Federalism (and Federalism as the New
Nationalism): A Complementary Account (and Some Challenges) to the Nationalist School, 59
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1045, 1045 (2015); Bulman-Pozen, supra note 145, at 1134.
147. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 145, at 1135–36.
148. Id. at 1136–38.
149. Id. at 1135.
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enough to capture what the nationalist school has been describing, but the new
nationalists—myself included—have not been sufficiently explicit about
precisely what we mean by the term nationalism. There’s plainly work to be
done here.
If I were to offer my own view, it would be very much like what BulmanPozen describes in her characteristically nuanced and thoughtful fashion: a
democratically inflected, pluralist account.150 I should place special emphasis
on the notion of pluralism here. Many of federalism’s proponents view
nationalism with suspicion precisely because they appreciate the benefits of
what I’ve termed “second-order diversity.”151 And nationalists—at least those
of the lawyering varietal—don’t help on this front because so many value
uniformity and consistency for reasons that have more to do with their
intellectual proclivities and professional commitments than a fully developed
account of how democracy should work. In my view, however, a nationalist
account should leave plenty of room for disuniformity: indeed, it should
celebrate it.
Gluck—a blazing star in the field and a colleague whom I adore—has her
doubts about the last claim. Indeed, she offers three worries about the
relationship between uniformity and national ends in my work. First, she reads
me as a “uniformist” seeking “an ideal national (i.e., single) policy
decision.”152
While I certainly believe that one benefit of state-based dissent is that it
can tee up the fight that changes national norms, I’ve long celebrated the
virtues of second-order diversity153and uncooperative federalism,154 separate
and apart from the role they play in forging new national norms. Indeed, I’ve
rebuked my fellow nationalists for their failure to celebrate our Tocquevillian
bureaucracy. As I wrote in Federalism All the Way Down:
Even as I side with the nationalists in thinking that it is perfectly acceptable for
national majorities to play the Supremacy Clause card, I argue that a national
system can withstand more division and dissent than typically imagined. My
account elides the principal-agent distinction, privileges messy overlap over
clear jurisdictional lines, and depicts power as fluid, contingent, and contested
. . . . A democratic defense of federalism-all-the-way-down suggests that we

150. Bulman-Pozen is one of the young scholars I most admire, so I’m tempted to invoke her
allegiance to this view as proof positive that it’s the right one.
151. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, supra note 16.
152. Gluck, supra note 146, at 1057.
153. See Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 16; Gerken, Second-Order
Diversity, supra note 16.
154. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 24.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2015]

FEDERALISM AND NATIONALISM: TIME FOR A DÉTENTE

1035

miss half the story when we view conflict, resistance, and parochialism with
155
such suspicion.

I similarly argued that it is a mistake to celebrate “the idiosyncratic dissenter,
the nobility of resistance, the glory in getting things wrong, the wild patchwork
of views that make up the polity” in the private realm but mourn it in the
public one.156
What’s true of my work seems equally true of the work of the nationalist
school as a whole. As Bulman-Pozen observes, “[n]ationalist federalism takes
from classic accounts of federalism an insistence on irrepressible diversity and
dissent, but instead of mapping contestation onto state-federal relations as
such, it regards diversity and dissent as national phenomena involving various
state and federal actors in shifting configurations.”157
Gluck nonetheless still worries that when push comes to shove, I’m a
uniformist at heart. Because I believe that the national government should set
the bounds on disuniformity, she’s concerned that my account still involves a
“single nationally chosen (preemptive) policy outcome, just one that endorses
disuniformity.”158
The characterization undergirding Gluck’s second worry seems correct, but
not the concern. As I’ve written elsewhere, a well-functioning national
democracy should not punt hard democratic decisions to the states, where
policy-making is easier simply because we’ve sorted ourselves so neatly into
red and blue enclaves. 159 It’s all too easy for national elites—it’s all too easy
for us—to relegate tough questions to local decision-makers rather than forge a
compromise at the national level. Just as it was once too easy to let states in the
Jim Crow South resolve questions of racial equality for themselves, today it’s
too easy to let states navigate the hard questions raised by gun rights, gay
rights, and abortion. Red and blue silos are not the products of a wellfunctioning democracy.
For these reasons, I’m not worried about what one might call “secondorder preemption.” Democracy means hashing things out. It’s perfectly fine if,
at the end of the day, we as a nation decide that the states can pursue different
paths. A well-functioning national democracy doesn’t require rigid uniformity;
it requires us to deliberate about which departures from national policy are
consistent with our norms and which are outside the bounds. Too often these
days, we aren’t deliberating; we’re just punting. We can’t even have a

155. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 16, at 71, 73.
156. Id. at 74.
157. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 145, at 1141.
158. Gluck, supra note 146, at 1057. I still puzzle a bit over how this is different from
federalism “by the grace of Congress,” which similarly involves a national decision about
whether and how far states can vary in their implementation of federal law. Id. at 1061.
159. This account is drawn from Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 9.
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conversation about national norms in the first place, let alone make a collective
decision about when and how they should matter. What Gluck casts as secondorder preemption, then, is what I would characterize as a well-functioning
national democracy.160 I should note, however, that none of this takes away
from Gluck’s core worry that the nationalists haven’t yet offered a fully
developed account of what nationalism is.
Gluck’s third worry also goes to the relationship between state
disuniformity and national ends. She worries that the new nationalist account is
“[i]ndistinguishable from [s]tates as [l]aboratories [f]ederalism.”161 Here I
think Gluck casts her critique at too high a level of generality.162 To be sure,
both the states-as-laboratories narrative and the new nationalists’ account of
the “discursive benefits of structure” depend on states being sites where
diverse norms are forged and different policies are enacted. But if that’s
enough to equate the two theories, then virtually all of the reasons
conventionally offered in federalism’s favor collapse into a single claim. After
all, states can only facilitate choice or compete for the hearts and minds of
citizens because they can promote different norms and enact different policies.
So, too, states can only serve as bulwarks of liberty because they can pursue
different paths than the federal government. Like the labs account, the new
nationalist story depends on diversity within state policymaking arenas. But the
new nationalists have a much less technocratic, much more wide-ranging
account of the discursive benefits this diversity promotes. Some of us have
explored the expressive and constitutive benefits associated with what I call
“dissenting by deciding.”163 Some have focused on the importance of states as
sites of political competition.164 Some have lauded the benefits associated with
playing out political conflicts in different settings with different power
dynamics.165 Still others have limned more technocratic themes having to do
with regulatory overlap and redundancy.166 Many of these ideas have little or
nothing to do with the states’ role as laboratories of experimentation, and
160. Moreover, I’d note that even those who endorse a robust sovereignty account subscribe
to this basic view. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, for instance, could be
characterized as a form of second-order preemption, as they prevent states from departing from
certain national norms even under a sovereignty account.
161. Gluck, supra note 146, at 1059.
162. Or perhaps Gluck simply has a more capacious mind than the rest of us and has thus
associated these values with the laboratories account even when others hadn’t. Elsewhere Gluck
asks whether federalism could always be understood as serving national ends. I think the answer
is yes, as I note above, supra note 7, but that’s not how federalism’s stalwarts have traditionally
understood their project.
163. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 16.
164. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 18.
165. Rodríguez, supra note 15; see also Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, supra note 16, at
1148–52, 1171–80.
166. See, e.g., SCHAPIRO, supra note 12.
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others involve claims far richer than the narrow notion that national
policymakers can learn from state experiments.
B.

Too Much Emphasis on the Power of the Servant?

A second, main theme emerged from the comments. Several commentators
pressed on my claims about what I cast as the three competing models of
federal-state relations: sovereignty, autonomy, and agency (which I also term
“the power of the servant”).167 Some thought I underplayed the importance of
the “power of the servant” vis-à-vis sovereignty and autonomy. Others thought
that federal-state relations inside cooperative federal regimes are too variegated
to be cast as a principal-agent relationship.
1.

The Continued Salience of the Sovereignty/Autonomy Model?

One set of scholars pressed on my claim that “we may have reached the
point where the sovereignty/autonomy debate is little more than an academic
sideshow.”168 Gillian Metzger insists that the “state autonomy and state
sovereignty are an important part of why running national programs through
the states adds value.”169 And Abbe Gluck wonders whether she needs to get
out of the “nationalist school” car given her own commitments to a sovereignty
model.170 (I find the latter especially amusing not just because it’s so witty, but
because I’ve always thought Abbe was the one pressing the accelerator.171)
Interestingly enough, I find myself in more agreement with Metzger than
Gluck, even though I’ve always thought of Gluck as a fellow traveler. But
Metzger’s comment is decidedly that of a nationalist, albeit a different sort of
nationalist than I am, whereas Gluck’s emphasis on state power for its own

167. Gerken, Of Sovereigns and Servants, supra note 44.
168. See supra text accompanying note 110.
169. Gillian Metzger, Edited Remarks: The States as National Agents, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
1071, 1073 (2015) [hereinafter Metzger, The States as National Agents]. I take that rebuke quite
seriously, especially coming from Metzger. One of the hallmarks of Metzger’s work is that she’s
usually one of the first-movers in the field. She was, for instance, one of the first scholars to think
hard about the administrative dimensions of federalism, Metzger, supra note 137, and her work
on horizontal federalism remains both one of the earliest and most important pieces in that field.
Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468
(2007). If Metzger tells you that you’ve gotten ahead of yourself, it’s wise to pay attention.
170. Gluck, supra note 146, at 1045.
171. In earlier work, I’d always cast “the power of the servant” as one of three competing and
complementary models of state power. See, e.g., Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, supra note
16, at 1367–68; Gerken, Our Federalism(s), supra note 110, at 1556–60. But Gluck’s work on the
pervasiveness of federal statutes has led me to think that the sovereignty and autonomy models
were even less relevant than I’d thought. E.g., Gluck, supra note 23, at 1998 (“[F]ederalism now
comes from federal statutes.”); id. at 1999 (“[F]ederalism leaves state power to the grace of
Congress.”); id. at 1998 (“Federalism today is something that mostly comes—and goes—at
Congress’s pleasure.”).
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sake sounds more conventional federalism themes than I’m willing to
endorse.172
To be sure, it may be ours is as much a semantic disagreement as a
substantive one. It wouldn’t be surprising if the semantics were getting in the
way of this discussion. Sovereignty, as I’ve written elsewhere, is not clearly
defined in the literature.173 It’s usually invoked to describe the power of states
to preside over their own empire. That notion, however, contains two distinct
threads. The first suggests that states regulate separate and apart from the
federal government. Neither Metzger nor Gluck mean to invoke this outdated
notion of “separate spheres.” But both emphasize the second thread associated
with the sovereignty model—the idea that states wield general lawmaking
authority. Metzger notes that states matter because “they are formally
independent levels of government: they have distinct electoral bases, and they
have a claim to representative legitimacy.”174 Gluck insists on the importance
of states’ “sovereign lawmaking apparatus.”175
It certainly matters that states possess a sizeable “lawmaking apparatus.”
It’s plainly the reason that states play such a crucial role in “Our Federalism,”
and Metzger is correct that the history and tradition of state sovereignty confer
greater salience upon that apparatus.176 Metzger is also right to say that it
matters both that states have “distinct electoral bases” and “representative
legitimacy.”177 I nonetheless think that it would be a mistake for the new
nationalists to hew to a sovereignty model. After all, cities and school boards
and juries all come with a salient history and tradition, they all have distinct
electoral bases, and they all possess some variant of democratic legitimacy.
More importantly for my purposes, they all can play similar, if not identical,
roles in “Our Federalism.”178 And yet none of these institutions possesses
sovereignty.
So what’s doing the work here? Metzger observes that states “are
governments, and that relates closely to the idea of states as sovereignty.”179
But I think she phrases that point in her characteristically careful fashion
precisely because the ideas relate to one another but aren’t necessary to one

172. I nonetheless think that Gluck clearly should be along for the ride. There’s plenty of
room for a range of aspirations in this car, as Abbe suggests there ought to be. Gluck, supra note
146, at 1051 (asking whether “the school is capacious enough to include a more state-centered
account and a true continuum across the categories”). Besides, who would want to take a road trip
without Abbe?
173. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 16, at 11–14.
174. Metzger, The States as National Agents, supra note 169, at 1072.
175. Gluck, supra note 146, at 1054.
176. Metzger, The States as National Agents, supra note 169, at 1073.
177. Id. at 1072.
178. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 16, at 21–33.
179. Metzger, The States as National Agents, supra note 169, at 1072.
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another. Even if state power is currently tied up with a sovereignty account, it
need not be. Cities, for instance, play an outsized role in “Our Federalism,” and
no one would conflate their power with that of a sovereign. So, too, juries and
school districts and zoning commissions and the myriad of sub-state and sublocal institutions constitute important players in what I’ve termed “Federalism
all the Way Down.”180 What matters here is regulatory power and an
independent democratic base, not sovereignty.
I don’t want to overstate the case. Metzger is plainly right that the notion
of sovereignty has vaulted states to their coveted spot on the governance
hierarchy. It’s therefore theoretically possible that as we leave the sovereignty
account behind, states’ power will decline and they will no longer be able to
serve the myriad roles that the nationalists have identified. But the death of
sovereignty was announced more than sixty years ago,181 and today states
nonetheless wield power largely without the benefit of sovereignty (and with
increasingly small opportunities for autonomous lawmaking). The form of
power that states wield has changed, but it’s not clear to me their power has
diminished. Moreover, powerful, partisan-aligned interests will have every
incentive to maintain the states’ salience going forward as they compete in the
national political arena.182 As long as these basic conditions hold—as long as
states continue to make law and answer to different constituencies than the
federal government’s—they should continue playing the productive role that
the nationalists have identified. For that reason, I’m hesitant to stick with an
account of state power that no longer gives us traction on the problems of the
day.
Gluck has a quite different take on the salience of sovereignty to this
debate. While Metzger wonders whether sovereignty is necessary for the states
to serve the ends the new nationalists have identified, Gluck sees state power
as an “end worth achieving itself.”183 I must confess I’ve struggled with this
idea ever since the Lecture, largely because I understand both decentralization
and centralization to be means to an end.184 I would understand if Gluck
thought that our end ought to be a state-centered democracy. But state power
“as an end worth achieving itself”?185 As I noted earlier, that strikes me as a
means bleeding into an end.186 Or maybe Gluck and I are just addressing
different questions when we talk about sovereignty. Sovereignty may not be
necessary for a nationalist account of federalism. But if you, like Gluck, were

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 16, at 21–33.
See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950).
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 18, at 1079, 1145.
Gluck, supra note 146, at 1050 (emphasis omitted).
Supra text accompanying notes 6–10.
Gluck, supra note 146, at 1050.
Supra text accompanying notes 8–9.
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concerned that the increase in national power would diminish the role of the
states, it wouldn’t be a surprise if sovereignty took on a different valence in
your analysis.
That being said, I admire Gluck’s evocative effort to cast Nationalism as
the New Federalism,187 whether or not it’s a complementary or a competing
account to Federalism as the New Nationalism. That’s not because I agree with
Gluck that we should empower the states for their own sake (as “states qua
states”)188 absent a convincing explanation as to why we ought to valorize
states over all the other institutions that serve the same, useful roles in our
system. But I certainly agree with Gluck that the states wield more power over
a federal program when they are what Jessica Bulman-Pozen and I have
termed “connected critics” working inside the system rather than autonomous
sovereigns laboring outside of it.189
Happily, the new nationalist tent is plainly capacious enough for both
Gluck’s account and mine, which may indirectly confirm Ryan’s and Rosen’s
observations that these labels are losing their analytic force over time.190 I’ve
been using terms like nationalism and federalism because that’s how the debate
is currently cast.191 But our task, at bottom, is to figure out how to make this
democracy work well, which means that at some point we may all find
ourselves discarding these terms and focusing entirely on what Rosen terms
“governancism.”192 I suspect that there will still be a divide among scholars as
to whether scholars prefer a state-centered or nation-centered democracy. But
no matter which we support, we will not—as nationalists and federalism
supporters do now—equate decentralization with one and centralization with
the other.
2.

The Limits of the Agency Model?

Just as one set of scholars worried about my analysis of the sovereignty
and autonomy models, another set wondered about whether the model I’ve put
forth—the agency model, which casts states power as the “power of the
servant”—adequately captures all cooperative federal regimes. Neither insists
that my descriptor cover every cooperative regime, be it formal or informal.
But Rosen suggests that the language of agency serves little purpose given that
these regimes involve such a diverse range of relationships, from “directed
187. Gluck, supra note 146, at 1046.
188. Id. at 1046 (emphasis omitted).
189. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 24, at 1288–89. See also Gerken, Federalism All
the Way Down, supra note 16, at 33–43.
190. Mark Rosen, The New Governancism, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1079 (2015); Erin Ryan,
Response to Heather Gerken’s Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?, 59 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 1147 (2015).
191. As Ryan graciously acknowledges. Ryan, supra note 190, at 1162.
192. Rosen, supra note 190, at 1083.
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agents” to “trusted delegees” to “partnerships.”193 Ryan goes so far as to
suggest that sometimes the federal government is the servant of the state.194
I agree with Rosen and Ryan that federal-state relations within cooperative
federal regimes are fluid and contextual and feature markedly different power
dynamics. In my view, however, all principal-agent relationships are fluid and
contextual and feature markedly different power dynamics. This variegation,
however, shouldn’t disable us from describing each of these relationships as
principal-agent regimes. I’m all for eschewing formalism, as must be clear
from this Lecture. But a bit of formalism has always guided our assessments of
these relationships, and with good reason. A principal-agent relationship exists
when a principal is formally entitled to command the agent but cannot always
do so in practice (administrative law and corporate law have long been
preoccupied with this disjuncture). That’s the idea I’m trying to capture. In the
regimes I’m describing, the national government is formally entitled to play
the supremacy clause trump card, even if that card doesn’t always end up being
a trump in practice. Nor do I believe my terminology is idiosyncratic. Rosen,
for example, analogizes federal-state relations to the relationship between
Congress and federal agencies,195 but I think that example makes my point.
Despite the “partnership” that exists between Congress and federal agencies,
scholars “consistently cast agencies as agents, never principals.”196 That’s also
why Ryan’s examples—federal regulations that incorporate state law, federal
programs that require state approval to move forward, etc.—haven’t changed
my mind.197 In almost all of her examples, the federal government has decided
to interact with the states in the fashion she describes. I have trouble seeing
why the federal government’s decision to pay these courtesies to the states
converts it into an agent of the states.
Setting aside this semantic quibble, though, I was fascinated by Rosen’s
and Ryan’s efforts to map out these differing relationships. It’s clearly one of
the many tasks on the nationalists’ school’s “to do” list, and there are few
people better able to do it than Ryan and Rosen. Ryan was one of the first
scholars to map these relationships in her important work on “negotiated
federalism,” and Rosen’s work in this area is noteworthy for its care and
subtlety. The tradeoff between context and concept is always a challenge for
law professors, and that is especially true here, where the new nationalists’
thick descriptive analysis may have changed some minds but hasn’t yet moved
us to the conceptual clarity I associate with conventional federalism arguments.

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 1098.
Ryan, supra note 190, at 1165.
Rosen, supra note 190, at 1099.
Brigham Daniels, Précis, Agency as Principal, 48 GA. L. REV. 335 (2014).
Ryan, supra note 190, at 1164–65.
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C. Too Little on Democracy?
One of the most provocative and engaging pieces in the symposium came
from the astute Sam Jordan, who asked whether I’ve paid enough attention to
the democratic dimensions of federalism.198 As an elections scholar who
accidentally wandered into the federalism arena, I was secretly delighted by
the challenge. I take Jordan’s worries about the democratic limits of federalism
quite seriously. My account of federalism, for instance, would have been a
non-starter before the Civil Rights movement, when the idea of empowering
racial minorities through governance would have seemed like a sick joke given
the vicious conditions that existed in the Jim Crow South. And Jordan is
certainly right that we must always be attentive to the limits of federalism
when democracy isn’t working properly. Moreover, as someone who believes
in the national supremacy trump card, I have an easier time answering
questions about Ferguson than traditional federalism scholars, who typically
resist federal encroachment on state and local powers. In my view, if local
democracy has faltered, it is perfectly acceptable for the federal government to
step in and help her get back on her feet.
Nonetheless, I view Ferguson largely as an election law problem rather
than a federalism problem. The problem of off-year election cycles and low
turnout among poor people is commonplace in the field of election law, and
it’s worth remembering just how high African-American turnout rates have
been in recent presidential election cycles nationwide. Moreover, even where
democracy has broken down, as in Ferguson, it’s worth asking the “as opposed
to what?” question. Where there is what Jordan describes as a “mismatch
between demographics and electoral outcomes,”199 is it better for racial
minorities to enjoy a substantial population majority at a local level or to have
that population constitute an electoral minority within some larger electorate?
The first at least allows for the possibility of change. The latter, however,
seems only to guarantee permanent submergence. Low turnout groups are
always at risk in a democracy, but that risk seems all the greater when they
constitute minorities in the electoral pool rather than (potential) majorities.
D. Not Enough on the Rules of Engagement?
The “rules of engagement” was much on the mind of the commentators,
just as it has been on mine. Gluck was the most provocative on this front,
rebuking the new nationalists for their efforts thus far,200 so I’ll focus my
response on her trenchant critique.

198. Samuel P. Jordan, Federalism, Democracy, and the Challenge of Ferguson, 59 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1103 (2015).
199. Id. at 1115.
200. Gluck, supra note 146, at 1051–69.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2015]

FEDERALISM AND NATIONALISM: TIME FOR A DÉTENTE

1043

I share Gluck’s worry that the nationalist school will always struggle to
provide the hard and fast doctrinal rules that have come so easily to traditional
federalism scholars, and I very much credit her with pushing this point from
the beginning. I do think, however, that Gluck underestimates how hard this is.
Gluck suggests the nationalist school “apparently intentionally”201 has failed to
offer up doctrinal rules and that I “embrace” the fact that we may end up
having to “muddl[e] through” these controversies.202
This is obviously a failure of exposition on my part. What Gluck takes to
be a sign of hubris, I meant as a sign of humility. Gluck is right to distinguish
between the federalism questions with which she is preoccupied (those
involving statutory interpretation) and those about which most of the new
nationalists write (those involving constitutional interpretation and democratic
design).203 The former lends itself more easily to the sorts of legal
pronouncement Gluck craves. That’s because a legislation approach holds so
much constant in the analytic equation. Gluck wants to figure out “what
exactly Congress intended the role of states to be when it includes states in a
federal statutory scheme that all agree is legitimate.”204 That is a challenging
inquiry, but at least it’s a familiar one.
The prior question, however, is even more complex. Those of us interested
in constitutional interpretation and democratic design—in what Congress
should do rather than what Congress did—must grapple with many more
factors in our equation. Ed Rubin describes this problem far more elegantly
than I have, with his comparison between the study of federal-state interactions
and the Mandelbrot set.205 Perhaps this is why Rubin joins me in wondering
whether the judiciary can ever be the ultimate arbiter of these questions.206
If you want to get a sense of how hard these questions are, take a look at
Rubin’s deeply engaging analysis of these puzzles, or read Gillian Metzger’s
initial effort to analyze the downsides of the new nationalist account.207 Or turn
to Rosen and Ryan’s schematics,208 which show just how complex and
201. Id. at 1045.
202. Id. at 1064.
203. Id. at 1054.
204. Id. at 1052.
205. Rubin, supra note 145, at 1117–18.
206. Id. at 1118.
207. Metzger is right that the new nationalists tend to be pretty sunny about their views.
Metzger, The Status as National Agents, supra note 169, at 1074. I’ve always thought it
appropriate to dwell on the affirmative account because the costs associated with this approach
are so obvious (and already well-documented in the literature). But Metzger demonstrates just
how fine a scholar she is in this part of her essay. Rather than trotting out the usual worries
associated with localism, she dwells on a set of risks that are internal to the new nationalist
account itself and that threaten to undermine it from within. Id. at 1074–76.
208. Rosen, supra note 190, at 1082–83, 1092, 1098, 1101; Ryan, supra note 190, at 1155–
59.
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variegated federal-state relations are. Or heed the observation of Ryan, who
has been—like Gluck—a pioneer in identifying rules of engagement for
federal-state relations. “[F]iguring out how to work through all this tension,”
she writes, “can be really, really hard.”209
None of this is intended to downplay the importance of the statutory
questions. Whatever one thinks Congress should do on the federalism front, it
is in fact setting the terms of federal-state relations in one policymaking arena
after another. That’s the lesson Gluck’s work teaches us all, and it’s impossible
not to be convinced by it.
CONCLUSION
While federalism scholars have long been divided into neatly delineated
camps it is time to declare a détente. As the work of the new nationalists makes
clear, proponents of both nationalism and federalism have pitched their tents
on unstable ground. First, the new nationalists have shown that the central
premise of the federalism/nationalism divide—that centralization favors
national interests and decentralization favors state interests—is false. Second,
the new nationalists have shown that the democracy we have should represent
a reasonably satisfying compromise for both sides. It is a different reality than
either camp desired, but it is also a different reality than either camp feared.
This work has thus unsettled the existing terrain and mapped new territory
going forward: common ground on which to build . . . or new terrain on which
to battle.

209. Ryan, supra note 190, at 1157.

